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The Sources of Law and the Value of Precedent: A
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Mary Garvey Algero*
This Article provides a contemporary and comparative
examination of the sources of law and the value ofprecedent
in Louisiana, a state whosejudicial system resembles those of
common lawjudicial systems of the United States, but whose
private civil law is rooted in the civil law traditions ofFrance
and Spain, which were prevalent in the territory ofLouisiana
in the late eighteenth century and early nineteenth century.
The Article examines the doctrines of "stare decisis " and
'jurisprudence constante" and the value of precedent in
select common law and civil law jurisdictions, then focuses
on Louisiana as an example ofa jurisdiction which, like many
jurisdictions worldwide, has valued precedent in such a way
that it is extremely influential, but not always binding on the
courts. The Article refers to this practice as "systemic
respect for jurisprudence " because the value of a precedent
is directly related to the status in the legal system of the court
deciding the prior case. An empirical study of the Louisiana
judiciary on the sources of law and the value of precedent in
Louisiana complements a discussion of these issues based on
scholarly works on Louisiana law and Louisiana judicial
opinions. The author concludes that many jurisdictions, both
common law- and civil law-based, are gravitating to
"systemic respect for jurisprudence" and away from strict
use of the traditional stare decisis and jurisprudence
constante doctrines. The Article then proposes law to codify
the principle of systemic respect for jurisprudence.
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The conditions of society, and men 's attitude towards them,
are slowly but constantly changing, and the law must do its
best to keep in harmony with contemporary life and thought.'
I. INTRODUCTION
Louisiana has a rich legal history, with its law and legal tradition
rooted primarily in French, Spanish, and Roman traditions.2 In 1803,
the United States purchased the territory of Louisiana, which included
the land that is now the State of Louisiana. Early attempts to set up
a common-law-based system in the territory failed; advocates for
creating a legal system based on the civil-law tradition similar to the
laws and tradition with which most of the French and Spanish
1. Theodore F. T. Plucknett, A Concise History ofthe Common Law 307 (5th
ed. 1956).
2. Shael Herman, The Louisiana Civil Code: A European Legacy for the
United States 9-11 (1993); Ferdinand F. Stone, Louisiana Tort Doctrine §§ 1-8, in
12 Louisiana Civil Law Treatise 1-16 (1977).
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residents were familiar prevailed. Inhabitants of Louisiana were
allowed to maintain civil law for private law; however, the court
system and public law were based on the American common law
model.4 In France, le Code civil des francais, which later became
known as the Code Napoleon, was promulgated in 1804, and it
provided an excellent model for those scholars in Louisiana who
drafted a code to govern this new state.
Over the next two hundred years, Louisiana's legal system and
legal doctrines developed and benefitted from influences from the
federal and state legal systems throughout the United States, the
French and Spanish legal systems, and other legal systems from
around the world. Because of its civilian tradition, Louisiana
scholars and judges often looked beyond the borders of the United
States in developing and interpreting Louisiana law and shaping the
methodology that would be applied in the legal system.
This article examines the sources of Louisiana law and the
methodology used to interpret that law today. Empirical data, as well
as a review of scholarly works on Louisiana law and judicial opinions
discussing Louisiana law, indicate that Louisiana's legal system has
adapted in a way that draws upon the strengths of the civil law
tradition while taking advantage of the availability of accurate reports
of priorjudicial decisions. With its sources of law being enacted law
and custom, its great respect forjudicial decisions, and yet its flexible
doctrine of jurisprudence constante to deal with precedent,
Louisiana's legal system is well-equipped to maintain the consistency
and predictability valued in a strong legal system while at the same
time keeping that law from becoming stale and outdated.6
3. Herman, supra note 2, at 28-32.
4. Symeon Symeonides, The Louisiana Judge: Judge, Statesman, Politician,
in Louisiana: Microcosm of a Mixed Jurisdiction 89, 91-92 (Vernon Valentine
Palmer ed., 1999); Nina Nichols Pugh, The Structure and Role of Courts ofAppeal
in Civil Law Systems, 35 La. L. Rev. 1163, 1188 (1975). The present article
primarily focuses on private law, as opposed to public, administrative, or criminal
law.
5. See Ferdinand Fairfax Stone, Tort Doctrine in Louisiana: From What
Sources Does It Derive?, 16 Tul. L. Rev. 489, 506-09 (1942), and examples cited
therein.
6. Accord A.N. Yiannopoulos, Louisiana Civil Law: A Lost Cause?, 54 Tul.
L. Rev. 830, 848 (1980) ("Not necessarily at the expense of certainty, Louisiana has
always enjoyed, and will continue to enjoy, flexibility in the administration of civil
justice."); Albert Tate, Jr., Civilian Methodology in Louisiana, 44 Tul. L. Rev. 673,
678 (1970) (noting that legislation provides consistency, but judges are free to
reinterpret legislation that they find has been incorrectly interpreted by a court in
a prior decision). Judge Tate explained,
While we should always strive for consistency in treatment of similar
interests and for coherency in the development of doctrinal concepts, we
are free in so doing to disregard prior judicial interpretations and to return
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Louisiana's legal system has struck a balance or has found a middle
ground to which other civil law systems and common law systems
seem to be gravitating. This middle ground works well in a society
in which we cannot always predict or even contemplate the legal
theories or actions that will be developed,7 but in which we can obtain
recent judicial opinions from around the world with just a few
keystrokes.
The Louisiana legal system is rooted in enacted law, at least a
portion of which is written in general terms.' This strong foundation
of law provides a solid base from which courts work to decide cases.
This foundation is enhanced by a strong respect for precedent,
especially for the decisions of the Louisiana Supreme Court, but also
a responsibility to independently examine the interpretation of
enacted law and the power to reject precedent when it is erroneous.9
to the initial legislative concepts and to the basic considerations of social
utility and fairness which underlie them.
Id. at 680.
7. See, e.g., Gulf Oil Corp. v. State Mineral Board, 317 So. 2d 576 (La. 1975)
(applying longstanding property law principles to a dispute over ownership interest
of oil royalties, which industry had not been contemplated when the code provisions
were written); see also John H. Tucker, Jr., The Code and The Common Law in
Louisiana, 29 Tul. L. Rev. 739, 758-59 (1955):
Louisiana decisions on subjects of the law not comprized [sic] in the
Civil Code contain frequent references to common law decisions ....
The commissioners who drafted the Louisiana Civil Code in 1825
realized that they could not foresee every possible situation that might
arise and could not make appropriate provision to meet these
contingencies. In their preliminary report to the Legislature they
suggested that in such cases the court would decide "according to the
dictates of natural equity, in the manner that 'amicable compounders' are
now authorized to decide, but that such decisions shall have no force as
precedents until sanctioned by the legislative will."
Id.
8. Reference is to the more general provisions of the Louisiana Civil Code.
See William Tetley, Mixed Jurisdictions. Common Law v. Civil Law, 60 La. L. Rev.
677, 703 (2000) (explaining that civil law codes provide the fundamental law, or
general principles, and statutes further explain the codes, followed by interpretation
by the courts, while in a common law system, common law statutes merely complete
the case law, which is a primary source of law); Tucker, supra note 7, at 757-58:
The essential difference between the civil and the common law lies in the
generating force of authority. In the common law it rests wholly in the
decisions of the court; in the civil law it is legislation. A code is not
intended to provide for every contingency that might arise. It is a
statement of general principles that are to be applied by deduction or
analogy to particular cases. It is the function of the court in the common
law jurisdictions to make the law. In the civil law the function of the court
is one of interpretation.
Id.
9. See Tate, supra note 6, at 677-78.
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Articles and texts on law often indiscriminately identify the two
types of legal systems or traditions as civil law and common law.
Civil law systems are usually associated with Roman law traditions,
while common law systems are usually associated with English
tradition.'0 A civil law system is considered by many to be based on
law that is written down or "codified," although a written code is not
required," while a common law system is considered to be based on
law that is primarily created by the judiciary as it renders decisions in
cases that come before it, although many common law jurisdictions
have enacted laws.'2 When enacted law exists, civilian codes tend to
be written in "relatively abstract" terms such that they can be applied
to many circumstances, even those that are unforeseen, while enacted
law in common law jurisdictions tends to be written in more specific
terms, meant to cover more particular circumstances. 3 Traditionally,
in civil law systems respect is paid to prior judicial decisions though
they are not considered to be law under such doctrines as the doctrine
of jurisprudence constante, while the doctrine of stare decisis is
applicable in common law systems. 14
10. See Yiannopoulos, supra note 6, at 831-33, for a discussion of the terms
"civil law" and "common law."
11. Robin M. White & Ian D. Willock, The Scottish Legal System 95-96 (2d
ed. 1999); Tate, supra note 6, at 673 n.4; 1 A.N. Yiannopoulos, Louisiana Civil
Law Systems Course Outline 74 (1971) (noting that Germany was without a civil
code before 1900, France did not codify its laws into a civil code until 1804, and
Greece was without a civil code until 1946).
12. See Yiannopoulos, supra note 11, at 74; Tate, supra note 6, at 673 n.4. For
example, all of the legal systems in the states that compose the United States have
enacted laws. See generally Robert S. Summers, Statutory Interpretation in the
United States, in Interpreting Statutes: A Comparative Study 407, 408 (D. Neil
MacCormick & Robert S. Summers eds., 1991).
13. Catherine Valcke, Quebec Civil Law and Canadian Federalism, 21 Yale
J. Int'l L. 67, 78, 82 (1996) (explaining the need for codal provisions to be
sufficiently abstract so that they will be "intertemporal" and not obsolescent, yet be
concrete enough to provide adequate guidance to judges who must apply them to
concrete situations). See also Claire M. Germain, Approaches to Statutory
Interpretation and Legislative History in France, 13 Duke J. Comp. & Int'l L. 195,
195-96 & n.4 (2003); Kathryn Venturatos Lorio, The Louisiana Civil Law
Tradition: Archaic or Prophetic in the Twenty-First Century?, 63 La. L. Rev. 1, 2
& nn. 4 & 5 (2002); A.N. Yiannopoulos, Civil Law System: Louisiana and
Comparative Law 96 (2d ed. 1999).
14. See James L. Dennis, Interpretation andApplication of the Civil Code and
the Evaluation of Judicial Precedent, 54 La. L. Rev. 1 (1993), for a concise
description and explanation of the legal methodology as a means of evaluating
judicial decisions as precedent in civil and common law systems. Judge Dennis
notes:
In the common law, judicial precedent plays a leading role, serving both
as a source of law and as an example of a prior judge's methodology in
reasoning from the case-law materials. On the other hand, a civil-law
judicial precedent plays only a supporting role. The Civil Code is the
2005]
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These generalizations about the two systems or traditions make
it relatively simple to discuss the different systems in general terms;
they may also make it simpler to classify legal systems or traditions.
The reality is that legal systems are not so precisely and easily
classified. For example, a third classification, "mixed jurisdiction"
or "bijural jurisdiction" has been used to describe jurisdictions such
as Louisiana, which are primarily rooted in the civil law tradition, but
have several attributes that come from the common law tradition. 5
Further, legal systems worldwide influence each other daily as
individuals and entities do business and otherwise interact across
jurisdictional lines, and courts across the world are called upon to
interpret each other's laws and procedures.
This article focuses on the sources of law and the value of
precedent in the Louisiana legal system today, 200 years after the
Louisiana Purchase and the enactment of the Napoleonic Code, which
so heavily influenced the development of law in Louisiana. Louisiana
seems to have followed a course similar to many jurisdictions around
the world, both civil and common. While statutory law, or law
written by a legislative body, takes precedent over other sources, the
value of prior court decisions has increased in Louisiana. Louisiana
Supreme Court decisions are considered "binding" authority to lower
courts in Louisiana, despite Louisiana scholars' commentary and
commentary by some courts to the contrary and despite the fact that
judicial decisions are not recognized in the Louisiana Civil Code as
a source of law. With regard to the decisions of intermediate
appellate courts and trial courts and with regard to the Louisiana
Supreme Court considering its own prior decisions, the doctrine of
jurisprudence constante still applies, that is, a consistent line of
judicial decisions on a particular issue is entitled to great weight and
primary source of law, and precedent serves merely as an example of a
prior judge's interpretation and application of legislated law.
Id. at 3. See also Tetley, supra note 8, at 702.
15. See Vernon V. Palmer, Mixed Jurisdictions Worldwide: The Third Legal
Family 5 (2001); Yiannopoulos, supra note 6, at 836-37, 848; Tate, supra note 6,
at 673. The mixed jurisdiction has become identified with legal systems such as
those in South Africa, Louisiana, and Quebec where civil law and the common law
traditions have mixed, and still mix, to a greater or lesser extent. The term
"bijuralism" has been defined more broadly: .'In its more restricted sense,
bijuralism means the coexistence within a country of units of government reflecting
distinctly different legal traditions, typically but not at all necessarily common law,
on the one hand, and civil law, on the other."' David Gruning, Bayou State
Bi'uralism: The Common Law and Civil Law in Louisiana, Univ. Det. Mercy L.
Rev. (forthcoming 2005) (quoting George A. Bermann & Menhard Hilf, Bijuralism
in Federal Systems and in Systems ofLocal Autonomy, page 1, XIIIth International
Congress of Comparative Law, General Report, Topic I.B. 1 (Montreal 1990)).
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is considered persuasive as to what the law is.16 Further, just one
decision by a court to which a lower court's decision is appealable is
often given great weight and persuasive value. Other civil law
jurisdictions seem to be gravitating in a similar direction, though
many have not expressly recognized that judicial decisions can have
any binding force.' 7
These findings, as well as a consideration of how other
jurisdictions value precedent, have led me to the conclusion that, as
to the interpretation of sources of law and the use of precedent,
Louisiana is among several jurisdictions that have employed a
principle referred to herein as "systemic respect for jurisprudence,"
which is somewhat of a hybrid of stare decisis and jurisprudence
constante. This term refers to a respect for prior decisions that is
influenced by the legal system's court hierarchy, the accepted sources
of law in the jurisdiction, a desire to maintain consistency and
constancy of law, and the need to allow some flexibility to allow the
law to develop. Interestingly, many common law legal systems
around the world, including most if not all of the jurisdictions other
than Louisiana in the United States, have placed a greater emphasis
on enacting laws and have relaxed their interpretation and use of the
doctrine of stare decisis. 18 At the same time, in civil law jurisdictions,
the availability of reported judicial decisions has allowed precedent
to become more widely known, perhaps filling the role that "custom"
played in sixteenth century France, 9 thereby increasing the
consideration of precedent in traditional civil law and mixed
jurisdictions.
Section II of this article defines and discusses the concepts of
precedent, stare decisis, and jurisprudence constante, with a brief
examination of the value of precedent in England, the United States
other than Louisiana, France, Italy, and Spain. Section III identifies
the sources of law in Louisiana's legal system according to the
Louisiana Civil Code and Constitution and discusses the role
precedent has played in the Louisiana legal system according to the
Louisiana Civil Code, Louisiana legal scholars, and published
Louisiana court opinions. Complementing this discussion are the
results of a survey of Louisiana state courtjudges. The survey sought
to determine Louisiana judges' use of various legal sources and the
use of sources by the attorneys who appear before them. Section IV
16. See infra sections III.D and IV.
17. See, e.g., infra section II.B for discussions of precedent in France, Italy,
and Spain. See also Interpreting Precedents: A Comparative Study 1 (D. Neil
MacCormick & Robert S. Summers eds., 1997).
18. See infra notes 41-43 and accompanying text.
19. 1 Marcel Planiol, Treatise on the Civil Law 8-9 (Louisiana State Law
Institute trans.,12th ed. 1959).
2005]
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provides the results of the survey and identifies what sources
attorneys and judges are in fact relying on to determine Louisiana
law. Finally, section V further discusses the concept of "systemic
respect forjurisprudence," a practice which has served Louisiana well
by allowing enacted law to remain the primary source of law and
allowing Louisiana law to remain current and change with societal
norms. It also proposes that an article be added to the Louisiana Civil
Code codifying and clarifying the proper treatment of prior decisions
by the courts.
II. PRECEDENT, STARE DECISIS, AND JURISPRUDENCE CONSTANTE
One characteristic common to most legal systems is that if a
lawmaking body of some sort has enacted law, that enacted law is a
source of law for that jurisdiction."0  Beyond enacted law,
jurisdictions tend to vary the respect paid to precedent and other
potential sources of law. "Precedent" has been defined as follows:
"Precedents are prior decisions that function as models for later
decisions."' "Applying lessons of the past to solve problems of the
present and future is a basic part of human practical reason."2 In day
to day life we often consider precedent, or what we have done in the
past, to help us make decisions and create rules, whether we do so
consciously or unconsciously. We strive to bring some consistency
to our actions in dealing with our coworkers, students, children, and
friends so that we will be fair in our dealings with others and will be
recognized as such.23 These same motivations are at work in judicial
systems around the world, whether the systems are grounded in the
civil law tradition, the common law tradition, or some other tradition;
a reliance on precedent creates certainty and stability for those parties
operating in a jurisdiction, and precedent is valued in legal
jurisdictions worldwide.24
20. Francesco G. Mazzotta, Precedents in Italian Law, 9 Mich. St. U.-DCL J.
Int.'l L. 121, 123 (2000); Interpreting Statutes: A Comparative Study 10 (D. Neil
MacCormick & Robert S. Summers eds., 1991).
21. Interpreting Precedents: A Comparative Study, supra note 17, at 1. See
also Mazzotta, supra note 20, at 121. For a further discussion of the concept of
precedent see Frederick Schauer, Precedent, 39 Stan. L. Rev. 571 (1987).
22. Interpreting Precedents: A Comparative Study, supra note 17, at 1. See
also William Thomas Tate, The Code, Custom and the Courts: Notes Toward a
Louisiana Theory of Precedent, 48 Tul. L. Rev. 1, 6 (1973) ("If someone else has
already considered a similar problem, it is only logical to look to the prior
reasoning.").
23. See Schauer, supra note 21, at 57-73.
24. Interpreting Precedents: A Comparative Study, supra note 17, at 2; see also
Interpreting Statutes: A Comparative Study, supra note 20, at 487 (concluding that,
together with any applicable statutes, "precedents are the most frequently used
782 [Vol. 65
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Modem legal systems, whether generally labeled "common law
systems" or "civil law systems," employ different doctrines to
determine the value placed on precedent, among other differences.
Typically, common law legal systems have been associated with the
doctrine of stare decisis, under which courts are bound by precedent,
and civil law systems have been associated with doctrines such as the
French doctrine of jurisprudence constante, which, in simple terms,
recognizes that a line of prior, consistent decisions may be persuasive
evidence of the proper interpretation of the law.25
A. Precedent in Common Law Systems
The doctrine of "stare decisis et quieta non movere," which
translates as "to stand by things decided and not disturb settled law,'26
in its broadest sense, commands judges to apply the law as it has been
set out in one prior case when the prior decision was made by a court
that is higher than, and sometimes equal to, the court rendering the
present decision.27 The only part of the decision that is binding is the
"ratio decidendi" or the rule of the decision, as opposed to extraneous
comments of the judges that are not necessary to the court's
decision.2"
materials in judicial opinions,"regardless of whether precedents are considered to
have the force of law or not).
25. See Valcke, supra note 13, at 83-85 & n.106, in which the author
denounces any similarity between the doctrines of stare decisis and jurisprudence
constante, explaining that in a civil law system the repetition of a particular
interpretation of a code article may simply reinforce the rationality of the earlier
decisions, but it in no way creates or changes the law or lessens the burden on
judges to interpret the code. She explains that stare decisis is necessary in a
common law system to maintain consistency when judges are filling in gaps in the
law, thus exercising a lawmaking function. This gap-filling is not necessary in a
civil law system in which the source of law is a code that is "gapless" and judges'
primary duty is to apply that law logically, rather than try to create consistency of
interpretation. Id. at 79-80, 83, 85 & n. 106. But see Dennis, supra note 14, at 7-8,
in which Judge Dennis opines that the Louisiana Civil Code, as well as the French
Civil Code, were not intended to be a "gapless system of legal rules." See also
Mazzotta, supra note 20, at 141 (discussing the Italian doctrine ofgiurisprudenza
constante).
26. Bryan A. Garner, A Dictionary of Modem Legal Usage 827 (2d ed. 1995).
27. See Alvin B. Rubin, Hazards of a Civilian Venturer in Federal Court:
Travel and Travail on the Erie Railroad, 48 La. L. Rev. 1369, 1371 (1988); see
also Dennis, supra note 14, at 4-5 (giving a clear and concise description of the
common law doctrine of stare decisis).
28. Zenon Bankowski et al., Precedent in the UnitedKingdom, in Interpreting
Precedents: A Comparative Study 325, 336 (D. Neil MacCormick & Robert S.
Summers eds., 1997). But see id. at 336-37 (recognizing that other parts of a
precedent that are not considered part of the ratio decidendi are frequently cited to
and considered by the courts).
2005]
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1. England
Stare decisis was not always the doctrine employed in common
law legal systems. Perhaps due to poorly organized court systems and
the lack of available and reliable case reports, prior to the seventeenth
century, cases were not considered binding by the courts in common
law systems.2 9 In fact, a description of the value of precedent in
England during the "Year Book" period, from approximately the
thirteenth century to the sixteenth century, sounds like a description
of the doctrine of jurisprudence constante: "A single case was not a
binding authority, but a well-established custom (proved by a more
or less casual citing of cases) was undoubtedly regarded as strongly
persuasive. 30 However, in the seventeenth century, the binding force
of a decision of the Exchequer Chamber was recognized.3 Referring
to the seventeenth century, Plucknett notes, "Here we find for the first
time the principle that a single case may be a binding precedent, but
such high authority attaches only to decisions of the Exchequer
Chamber."32
In other courts in England, the citation of precedents became more
commonplace over the next century, though one case on its own still
lacked precedential value.33 Then, in nineteenth century England, the
reorganization of the courts, the professionalization of judges'
positions, and improvements in the system of reporting prior
decisions made it possible to have a system in which precedents
received much greater respect. 34 English courts became strictly bound
by the decisions of the courts above them in the court system.35
Today, decisions of the High Courts, which are somewhat
comparable to trial courts in the United States, do not bind any other
courts, but serve merely as persuasive authority for other High Courts
and inferior courts.36 Decisions of the Courts of Appeals bind the
29. Plucknett, supra note 1, at 342-50.
30. Id. at 347.
31. Id. at 348.
32. Id.
33. Id. at 348-49. Plucknett explained:
Printing and the later abridgements obviously made it possible to assemble
a large number of citations, and so an increase in the number of cases cited
is easily explained. Their very number is significant: under a developed
system of precedents one case is as good as a dozen if it clearly covers the
point. The eighteenth century, however, still seems tempted to find safety
in numbers, and to regard the function of citations to be merely that of
proving a settled policy or practice.
Id. at 349.
34. Id. at 350.
35. See Bankowski, supra note 28, at 325.
36. Id. at 326.
784 [Vol. 65
MARY GAR VEYALGERO
High Courts below them in the same hierarchy and, absent unusual
circumstances, bind the Court of Appeals rendering the decision.37
Finally, decisions of the House of Lords, which is roughly equivalent
to the United States Supreme Court, are strictly binding on all lower
courts and on the House of Lords itself, though, the Court has
established a practice of overruling precedents when they are
determined to be unsatisfactory, especially when they can be
distinguished. In this system, precedent is considered a source of
law, whether it is based on one decision or one hundred decisions. 9
2. The United States, Other Than Louisiana
The forty-nine states in the United States, other than Louisiana,
as well as the United States federal court system follow a version of
the doctrine of stare decisis that is similar to the English respect for
precedent and its consideration of precedent as a source of law. The
doctrine of stare decisis, as well as the hierarchical structures of the
court systems, typically require the lower courts in those jurisdictions
to be bound by the decisions of the courts to which the lower courts'
decisions are appealable.4" In these jurisdictions, judicial decisions
37. Bank of Credit & Commerce Int'l SA v. Ali, [2002] C.P. Rep. 11, 13
(Eng. C.A.); Bankowski, supra note 28, at 325-26.
38. The House of Lords issued a notice in 1966 stating its position on stare
decisis and the use of precedent, which changed the practice that had been in
existence since 1898:
Their lordships regard the use ofprecedent as an indispensable foundation
upon which to decide what is the law and its application to individual
cases. The use ofprecedent provides some degree ofcertainty upon which
individuals can rely in conduct of their affairs, as well as a basis for
orderly development oflegal rules. Their lordships nevertheless recognize
that too rigid adherence to precedent may lead to injustice in a particular
case and also unduly restrict the proper development of the law.
House of Lords Notice, 2 Lloyd's Rep. 151 (July 26, 1966). See Bankowski, supra
note 28, at 326, 348-49; see also Interpreting Precedents: A Comparative Study,
supra note 17, at 5 (explaining that today highest courts around the world are
"universally empowered" to correct their own errors). But see Bankowski, supra
note 28, at 329 (noting that although the House of Lords has the power to overrule
its prior decisions, it has done so infrequently.)
39. Bankowski, supra note 28, at 323; David M. Walker, The Scottish Legal
System: An Introduction to the Study of Scots Law 438-39 (8th ed. 2001).
40. See, e.g., Hohn v. United States, 524 U.S. 236,251, 118 S. Ct. 1969, 1977
(1998). In Hohn, the Court stated, "Stare decisis is 'the preferred course because
it promotes the evenhanded, predictable, and consistent development of legal
principles, fosters reliance on judicial decisions, and contributes to the actual and
perceived integrity of the judicial process."' (quoting Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S.
808, 827, 111 S. Ct. 2597, 2609 (1991). The Court in Hohn further explained that
its decisions "remain binding precedent until we see fit to reconsider them,
regardless of whether subsequent cases have raised doubts about their continuing
2005]
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have the force of law-judge-made law or common law. Despite the
apparent rigidity of this doctrine, the United States Supreme Court
has the express power to overrule its own decisions," as do most of
the state supreme courts.4 2 Moreover, United States courts typically
venture from strict adherence to precedent when the precedent
appears to be outdated, when "the existing rule has produced
undesirable results," or when "the prior decision was based on what
is now recognized as poor reasoning." '43
vitality." Id. at 252-53. See also Gavin v. Chemoff, 546 F.2d 457, 458-459 (1st
Cir. 1976) (invoking stare decisis to follow an earlier opinion when "appellants
essential arguments remain much the same as those considered and previously
rejected .... [and there were] no compelling new reasons and no change in
circumstances justifying reconsideration of the previous decision"); Mountain
View Coach Lines, Inc. v. Storms, 476 N.Y.S.2d 918 (N.Y. App. 2d Dep't 1984)
(appellate division is single statewide court divided into departments for
convenience, therefore trial courts are formally bound to follow precedents in
another department); People v. J.R. Cooperage Co., 485 N.Y.S.2d 438 (Sup. Ct.
1985) (in absence ofappellate ruling from that department, Supreme Court criminal
term is formally required by stare decisis to follow prercedents of another
department).
41. Hohn, 524 U.S. at 252-53, 118 S. Ct. at 1978. But see Justice Scalia's
dissent in Hohn, with whom Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices O'Connor and
Thomas joined, in which the justices explained: "[A] doctrine of stare decisis that
is suspended when five Justices find it inconvenient (or, indeed, as the concurrence
suggests, even four Justices in search of a fifth) is no doctrine at all, but simply an
excuse for adhering to cases we like and abandoning those we do not." Id. at 263.
In Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 809, 111 S. Ct. 2597, 2600 (1991), Justice
Rehnquist reasoned that the doctrine of stare decisis did not require the court to
follow prior precedent. He further explained, "Although adherence to the doctrine
of stare decisis is usually the best policy, the doctrine is not an inexorable
command. This Court has never felt constrained to follow precedent when
governing decisions are unworkable or badly reasoned.... ." 501 U.S. at 809, 111
S. Ct. at 2600.
42. See, e.g., Johnson Controls, Inc. v. Employers Ins. of Wausau, 665 N.W.2d
257, 286 (Wis. 2003) (citing Schwanke v. Garlt, 263 N.W. 176, 178 (Wis. 1935)
(expressly recognizing the power of a jurisdiction's highest court to "repudiate its
prior rulings" and depart from a prior precedent)).
43. Helene S. Shapo, Marilyn R. Walter, & Elizabeth Fajans, Writing and
Analysis in the Law 13-14 (4th ed. 2003). See also James F. Spriggs, II & Thomas
G. Hansford, The U.S. Supreme Court's Incorporation and Interpretation of
Precedent, 36 Law & Soc'y Rev. 139, 140 (2002) (examining the Supreme Court's
use of precedent); see, e.g., Hohn, 524 U.S. at 251, 118 S. Ct. at 1977 (overruling
the Court's earlier decision in House v. Mayo, 324 U.S. 42, 65 S. Ct. 517 (1945),
and explaining that "stare decisis is a 'principle ofpolicy' rather than 'an inexorable
command"'); People v. Blehm, 983 P.2d 779, 788 (Colo. 1999) (explaining that
under the stare decisis doctrine, courts should follow an established rule of law,
"unless clearly convinced that the rule was originally erroneous or is no longer
sound because of changing conditions and that more good than harm will come
from departing from precedent"); Fitzpatrick v. State, 859 So. 2d 486 (Fla. 2003)
(reversing appellant's conviction because the jury relied upon an erroneous
definition of burglary as the basis for the felony murder conviction; thus, the
MARY GAR VEYALGERO
B. Precedent in Civil Law Systems
On the other hand, in legal systems based on the civil law
tradition, cases are not formally recognized as a source of law, and
the doctrine of stare decisis is not recognized. When considering
precedent, courts are likely to look at prior decisions as mere
interpretations of the law, and the courts are often free to decide
consistently with the prior court's interpretation of the law or reject
the prior interpretation.' In some civil law systems, the doctrine of
"jurisprudence constante" or "giurisprudenza constante" calls on
these courts to recognize the persuasive value of a long line of
precedents. For example, in Louisiana, this doctrine has been
described as follows: "[W]hen, by repeated decisions in a long line
of cases, a rule of law has been accepted and applied by the courts,
these adjudications assume the dignity of Jurisprudence constante;
and the rule of law upon which they are based is entitled to great
weight in subsequent decisions."'45 Nevertheless, although many civil
appropriate application of the stare decisis doctrine required the court to recede
from a decision when the application of that decision plainly demonstrated that it
was wrongly decided.); Smith v. Dep't of Ins., 507 So. 2d 1080, 1096 (Fla. 1987)
(Ehrlich, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part) ("[p]erpetuating an error in legal
thinking under the guise of stare decisis serves no one well and undermines the
integrity and the credibility of the Court."); Johnson Controls, 665 N.W.2d at
287-88 (departing from stare decisis and overruling prior precedent, explaining,
"This court has no apprehension about being a solitary beacon in the law if our
position is based on a sound application of this state's jurisprudence. But when our
light is dim and fading, then this court must be prepared to make a correction.";
identifying the following circumstances in which overruling prior precedent may be
justified: (1) "changes or developments in the law have undermined the rationale
behind a decision;" (2) "there is a need to make a decision correspond to newly
ascertained facts;" (3) "there is a showing that the precedent has become
detrimental to coherence and consistency in the law;" or (4) "the prior decision is
unsound in principle, ... it is unworkable in practice, [or] ... reliance interests are
implicated").
But see Welby Gardens v. Adams County Bd. of Equalization, 71 P.3d 992
(Colo. 2003) (explaining that while the state supreme court is not bound by
decisions of the court of appeals or by the interpretations of a statute provided by
an administrative agency that misapplies or misconstrues the law, the court is
hesitant to overrule the sole appellate construction of a statute that has been in place
for many years and that has been incorporated into the state-wide administrative
standards without a compelling reason to do so).
44. See infra this section and sections III and IV for a more specific discussion
of the use of precedent in the French, Italian, Spanish, and Louisiana judicial
systems.
45. Johnson v. St. Paul Mercury Ins. Co., 236 So. 2d 216, 218 (La. 1970). See
also Mazzotta, supra note 20, at 141 (discussing the Italian doctrine of
giurisprudenza constante); Valcke, supra note 13, at 84 n. 106 (explaining that
under the doctrine of jurisprudence constante in a civil law system, the repetition
of a particular interpretation of a code article may simply reinforce the rationality
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law jurisdictions have recognized some form of the restrained
doctrine ofjurisprudence constante, the prevalence and availability of
reported decisions and the hierarchical nature of modem court
systems has led to the recognition that even a single decision by a
highly ranked court may carry great weight or even serve as a defacto
binding authority.46 A consideration of the value of precedent in
France, Italy, Spain, and Louisiana reveals this practice.
1. France
Commenting on precedent in France, one commentator explained:
"There is no formal bindingness of previous judicial decisions in
France. One might even argue that there is an opposite rule: that it is
forbidden to follow a precedent only because it is a precedent."'47
Article 455 of the French Code of Civil Procedure requires courts to
explain the reasoning behind their decisions and makes a judicial
decision based solely on a precedent illegal.4" Despite the lack of
bindingness of "precedents," the decisions of higher courts in the
ofthe earlier decisions, but it does not create or change the law); Dennis, supra note
14, at 15.
46. Michel Troper & Christophe Grzegorczyk, Precedent in France, in
Interpreting Precedents: A Comparative Study 103, 119, 122-23, 130-31 (D. Neil
MacCormick & Robert S. Summers eds., 1997); Pugh, supra note 4, at 1202
(recognizing pressure upon lower courts in civilian jurisdictions to follow decisions
of higher courts); see also infra notes 113-17, 121-24, and accompanying text on
Louisiana law.
47. Troper & Grzegorczyk, supra note 46, at 115. See also id. at 111-12
(quoting F. Zenati, La Jurisprudence, Paris: Dalloz 102 (1991)) ("' [T]he very idea
that a judge could search for the base of his decision in a prior judgment is literally
unthinkable in a legal system based on statutory Law."'); Valcke, supra note 13, at
84 ("A lower court in France has no formal duty to follow a higher tribunal's
decisions, and the highest court, the Cour de cassation, enjoys full power to
renounce its own decisions."). Butsee Mitchel de S.-O.-I'E. Lasser, Judicial (Self-)
Portraits: Judicial Discourse in the French Legal System, 104 Yale L.J. 1325,
1326, 1403-05 (1995) (recognizing the tension in France between the fact that the
legislature can be the only "source of law" and the fact that judges create "judicial
norms" that function as law; explaining the "grammatical discourse" as the official
role of the French judge, that is the role of mechanically applying statutory law,
and the "hermeneutic discourse" as the unofficial role of the French judge, that is
the role ofengaging in policy analysis, considering the statutory law as well as rules
ofj urisprudence, social and economic policy considerations, and equity arguments).
48. Troper & Grzegorczyk, supra note 46, at 115, 117-19 (citing N.C.P.C. art.
455). The article provides: "The judgment must state succinctly the respective
claims of the parties and their arguments (moyens); it must be reasoned (motivg)."
N.C.P.C. art. 455 (George A. Bermann & Vivian Grosswald Curran trans., Juris
Publishing, Inc. 1998). See also C. Civ. art. 5 (George A. Bermann & Vivian
Grosswald Curran trans., Juris Publishing, Inc. 1998) (providing: "Judges are
forbidden to decide by way of a general and rule-making (r~glementaire) decision
the cases submitted to them.").
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French judicial system certainly have force for the lower courts whose
decisions will be appealable to those same courts. These lower courts
must conduct their own analysis of the cases that are presented to
them in light of the applicable enacted law, but they decide cases
knowing that the higher court may reverse them should they decide
in such a way that is inconsistent with the higher court's earlier
decisions.49 Thus, the decisions of the higher courts can provide an
"authoritative argument" to the lower courts on how to interpret the
enacted law, though "the lower court has no legal obligation to follow
that argument.,
50
This method of allowing precedent to play an important role,
though not allowing it to bind courts, has been described as creating
a "de facto obligation" to follow precedents, which arises from the
hierarchy within the court system . French courts are only bound to
follow the official sources of law-the Constitution, European law,
statutes, and codes-even though precedents are frequently cited to the
courts to explain how to interpret and apply these sources.52 Thus,
these cases interpreting statutes have, in many ways, become a de
facto source of law to lower courts because they represent the
accepted interpretation of the statutes.53
2. Italy
The Italian system considers precedents in much the same way as
the French system. Commenting on precedent in Italy, one
commentator explained: "In the Italian legal system no precedent may
be considered as strictly binding: the main reason for this is that it is
49. Troper & Grzegorczyk, supra note 46, at 117-19; see also Yvon
Loussouarn, The Relative Importance of Legislation, Custom, Doctrine, and
Precedent in French Law, 18 La. L. Rev. 235, 258 (1958).
50. Troper & Grzegorczyk, supra note 46, at 111. See also Pugh, supra note
4, at 1170; Loussouarn, supra note 49, at 258.
51. Troper & Grzegorczyk, supra note 46, at 118-19.
52. Id. at 112-13, 117. See also Germain, supra note 13, at 195; Loussouarn,
supra note 49, at 250-54 (discussing the role of custom as a source of law in
France).
53. Troper & Grzegorczyk, supra note 46, at 118-19. Professors Troper and
Grzegorczyk explained:
A precedent is binding to the extent that a decision by a lower court
contrary to a precedent by a superior court can be reversed by that superior
court. But, as already mentioned, French courts have no obligation to
follow a precedent as such, but only to the extent that it is considered by
the superior courts as the "correct" application of a rule. What the
precedent stands for is the rule.
Id. at 129. See also Lasser, supra note 47, at 1404-05 (referring to precedent as
establishing "judicial norms" and as "mere authority," as opposed to the "law,"
which comes from the legislature).
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not a system based upon the principle of formally binding
precedent."54 Precedents are not a source of law. Even decisions of
the Corte di Cassazione do not bind lower courts.55 Thus, if "the
basis of the legal regulation of a matter can be found in precedents,
a reference to some statutory provisions is required. In many
instances such a reference is weak and vague, but nevertheless the
prevailing opinion is that precedents cannot be the only basis of a
judicial decision."56 Italian courts are only bound to follow the
official sources of law-codes, constitution, and statutes-even though
precedents are frequently cited to the courts to explain how to
interpret and apply the statutes. 7 In fact, "precedents are now by far
the most important justificatory material used in judicial opinions,"
and they far surpass any reliance on academic or professional
writings.58
Despite the lack of bindingness of "precedents," the decisions of
higher courts in the Italian judicial system certainly have great
influence on and are persuasive to lower courts whose decisions will
be appealable to those same courts.5 9 These lower courts can adopt
a different position on the legal issue; however, they are expected to
adequately explain the reasons for disregarding the decision of the
higher court if they choose not to follow the precedential decisions.6"
The lower courts have a right, not an obligation, to apply the previous
ruling.61 Thus, the decisions of the higher courts are instructive to the
54. Michele Taruffo & Massimo La Torre, Precedent in Italy, in Interpreting
Precedents: A Comparative Study 141, 154 (D. Neil MacCormick & Robert S.
Summers eds., 1997).
55. Mazzotta, supra note 20, at 150. The Corte di Cassazione is the court of
last resort for most civil and criminal cases. (Constitutional issues and
administrative law issues are considered by other courts, outside of the system of
"ordinary jurisdiction," of which the Corte di Cassazione is a part.) The Corte di
Cassazione hears appeals from decisions of an intermediate level of appellate
courts, which includes the Corte d'Appello, the Tribunale, and the Corte d'Assise
d'Appello. The first level of courts in the system includes two courts of limited
jurisdiction and one court of general jurisdiction. Taruffo & La Torre, supra note
54, at 141-42.
56. Mazzotta, supra note 20, at 148.
57. Id. at 153.
58. Id.
59. Taruffo & La Torre, supra note 54, at 154-55. See also Mazzotta, supra
note 20, at 141, 137 (explaining that it is unusual for a lower court to render a
decision that is inconsistent with a decision of the Corte di Cassazione and noting
that decisions ofthe Corte di Cassazione are most persuasive, followed by decisions
of the appellate courts); Pugh, supra note 4, at 1186. But see id. at 134 (noting that
the Italian Constitution does not subordinate lower courts to higher courts) (citing
Cost. art. 107(3)).
60. Taruffo & La Torre, supra note 54, at 155.
61. Id. at 156.
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lower courts on how to interpret the enacted law.62 Moreover, in
addition to a consideration of the level of the court that rendered a
prior decision, the persuasive value of prior decisions is significantly
increased when a line of cases, as opposed to only one case, supports
a particular interpretation of the law, in which case the interpretation
is considered "giurisprudenza constante" or "consolidata," and courts
are "bound" by the interpretation "except for very good
countervailing reasons.
3. Spain
In Spain, another system whose laws and judicial traditions have
served as an influence on the laws and judicial traditions in
Louisiana,' a fundamental principle of law is that "'the judge is
bound by (statutory) law and not by "precedent .... 65 This statement
is based in large part on the fact that jurisprudence, or precedent, is
not listed in the Codigo Civil (the Civil Code of Spain) as one of the
sources of law, which are legislation, custom, and general principles
of law.66 However, article 1(6) of the Codigo Civil recognizes that
"jurisprudence of the courts shall serve as a complement to the legal
order with the doctrine that, in a constant manner, may be established
by the Supreme Court, in its interpretation of legislation, customs,
and the general principles of law."6 7 Thus, although the legislature
has not recognized precedent as a formal source of law, it has
recognized its value.
The structure of the court system also lends itself to a great
respect for the prior decisions of higher courts. A typical civil case
will be decided first by a lower trial court, which is referred to as a
juzgados.68 An appeal from this court's decision may be taken to an
62. Id.
63. Id. at 160-61.
64. See Robert Anthony Pascal, Of the Civil Code and Us, 59 La. L. Rev. 301,
301-03 (1998) (opining that Louisiana law was primarily based on Spanish civil
law in the early 1800s, but recognizing that the French Code Civil of 1804 provided
a model of form and organization for the Louisiana Civil Code). Professor Pascal
referred to the first digest of Louisiana law, A Digest of the Civil Laws in Force in
the Territory of Orleans in 1808, as a "Spanish girl in French dress." Id. at 303.
65. Alfonso Ruiz Miguel & Francisco J. Laporta, Precedent in Spain, in
Interpreting Precedents: A Comparative Study 259, 269 (D. Neil MacCormick &
Robert S. Summers eds., 1997) (quoting Constitutional Court ruling 49/1985).
66. Article 1(1) of the Codigo Civil (the Civil Code of Spain) provides in part:
"The sources of the Spanish legal order are legislation, custom, and the general
principles of law." C.C. art. 1(1) (trans. Julio Romanach, Jr., Lawrence Publishing
Co. 1994).
67. Id. art. 1(6).
68. See Miguel & Laporta, supra note 65, at 260.
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intermediate appellate court, known as the Tribunales Superiores de
las Comunidades Autonomas. Seventeen of these courts exist in
Spain, with their jurisdiction over appeals corresponding with
seventeen different autonomous communities, somewhat similar to
the numbered intermediate appellate courts in the United States
federal court system. Often, the intermediate appellate courts provide
the fmal review of lower court decisions. An appeal from one of the
intermediate appellate courts would typically be to the Tribunal
Supremo.69 Spanish procedural law allows an appeal to the Tribunal
Supremo when two intermediate appellate courts have reached
inconsistent decisions in similar cases.7" In this circumstance, the
decision of the Tribunal Supremo establishes the jurisprudence on the
issue, and other courts face reversal if they decide differently. This
system provides yet another recognition of the value of precedent in
the Spanish legal system.
The above provisions explain in part why the courts show a great
respect for precedent and almost always follow the interpretations of
the law provided by the courts above them in the hierarchy of the
court system.7' Other factors contributing to this respect are the fact
that lower court judges depend on higher court judges for career
promotions and that lower court decisions are reviewed by the higher
courts.
7 2
II. SOURCES OF LAW AND THE VALUE OF PRECEDENT IN
LOUISIANA
As a legal system that has been influenced by the systems
discussed above, the Louisiana legal system has developed in a way
that most closely resembles the civil law jurisdictions when it comes
to the sources of law and the value of precedent with one
exception-the express judicial recognition that Louisiana Supreme
Court decisions are binding on the lower courts.73 Much like the
Civil Code of Spain, the Louisiana Civil Code identifies the sources
of law-legislation and custom. 74 In the absence of legislation and
custom, the Civil Code directs judges to "proceed according to
equity."75 Although cases interpreting the primary sources of law are
not recognized by the Legislature as being sources of law themselves,
Louisiana Supreme Court and appellate court decisions are important
69. Id. at 260-61.
70. Id. at 274.
71. Id. at 274-75, 288.
72. Id. at 274-75.
73. See infra notes 114-56 and accompanying text.
74. La. Civ. Code art. 1 (1999).
75. Id. art. 4.
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to consult in determining the meaning of Louisiana law 1) because
the Louisiana Constitution gives these bodies supervisory 76 and
appellate jurisdiction,77 respectively, over civil and criminal cases that
arise from the courts within their jurisdictions; and 2) because the
Louisiana Supreme Court has identified its decisions as binding
statements of Louisiana law.78
A. Legislation
Legislation, or enacted law, is the primary source of law in
Louisiana.7 9 The term "legislation" in the Louisiana Civil Code refers
to "rules enacted by a person or group of persons enjoying legislative
authority."8 Thus, in Louisiana, legislation includes the United
States Constitution, the Louisiana Constitution, and all federal and
state statutes. The Louisiana Civil Code governs most private law
issues, divided into a preliminary title and four books, including Book
I, Of Persons; Book II, Of Things and the Different Modifications of
Ownership; Book 1I, Of the Different Modes of Acquiring the
Ownership of Things; and Book IV, Conflict of Laws. Other sources
of state legislation are the Louisiana Constitution, the Louisiana
Revised Statutes, the Louisiana Children's Code, the Louisiana Code
of Evidence, the Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure, and the
Louisiana Code of Criminal Procedure.
What primarily distinguishes articles in the Louisiana Civil Code
from other Louisiana legislation is that, in the civilian tradition, the
Civil Code articles tend to be written in general terms such that they
are able to last through time and be applied to changing
circumstances; the non Civil Code provisions tend to address specific
issues, sometimes raised by the application of the more general code
provisions.8 ' In a similar way, many statutes in common law
76. La. Const. art. 5, § 5(A) & (C).
77. Id. art. 5, § 10(A). The courts of appeal also have jurisdiction over matters
appealed from family and juvenile courts. Id.
78. See, e.g., Pelican State Assocs., Inc. v. Winder, 253 La. 697, 219 So. 2d
500 (1969).
79. La. Civ. Code arts. 1-3 (1999).
80. Yiannopoulos, supra note 11, at 85.
81. See, e.g., Ardoin v. Hartford Acc.& Indem. Co., 360 So. 2d 1331, 1334-36
(La. 1978) (interpreting the general Louisiana tort law provision, La. Civ. Code art.
2315, in light of a Louisiana Revised Statute that specifically addresses tort liability
by physicians and dentists, La. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 9:2794. The court explained that
the Legislature enacted section 9:2794 to provide "guidance in applying the Civil
Code's general principle of fault" to the specific issue of physician and dentist tort
liability.); see also Lorio, supra note 13, at 2 & nn. 4 & 5; Tetley, supra note 8, at
703 (explaining that civil law statutes "complete" the civil code provisions, which
are written concisely without great detail).
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jurisdictions are written to address specific issues, but these issues
have typically arisen from prior court decisions and the common law
that has arisen from those decisions."2
The courts are charged with interpreting and applying enacted
law. Louisiana Civil Code articles 9-13 provide guidance to the
courts on this function. Article 9 provides: "When a law is clear and
unambiguous and its application does not lead to absurd
consequences, the law shall be applied as written and no further
interpretation may be made in search of the intent of the
legislature." 3 Louisiana Civil Code articles 10-12 instruct courts on
how to interpret the meaning of the words of a statute and how to
interpret a statute when the language of the statute is susceptible to
different meanings.8 4 Article 13 provides that "[f]aws on the same
subject matter must be interpreted in reference to each other." 5
B. Custom
Custom is the other source of law in Louisiana. The Louisiana
Civil Code provides, "Custom results from practice repeated for a
long time and generally accepted as having acquired the force of law.
Custom may not abrogate legislation." 6 According to the late French
professor and scholar Marcel Planiol, 7 customary law is "law which
has not been sanctioned by legislation. It consists of traditional rules
established little by little in the course of time, and which are often
difficult to ascertain." 8 Customary law has historically been the
primary source of private law "in primitive societies" and in societies
ruled by weak governments; 9 it plays a less influential role in large,
modem societies with well-organized governments and little
82. Tetley, supra note 8, at 703.
83. La. Civ. Code art. 9 (1999).
84. Id. arts. 10-12.
85. Id. art. 13.
86. Id. art. 3.
87. Professor Marcel Planiol was a professor of civil law studies in France who
wrote one of the preeminent treatises on the French Civil Code in the late 1800s and
early 1900s. Professor Planiol's treatise was translated by the Louisiana State Law
Institute in 1959 and since that time it has served as a valuable resource concerning
the meaning of the Louisiana Civil Code. See Planiol, supra note 19.
88. Planiol, supra note 19, at 8-9. See also Loussouam, supra note 49, at 248
("[F]or a practice to be considered custom it must not only be generally recognized
and constant, but also generally regarded as juridically binding. It is practice
reflecting a juridical sentiment."). That customary law is written down does not
change its status from custom to written law; written law must be enacted by a
legislative body, while custom is not the enactment of a legislative body. Planiol,
supra note 19, at 8. For example, in the sixteenth century, the customs of various
regions of France were written down. Id. at 9.
89. Planiol, supra note 19, at 8-9.
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opportunity for common practices to develop and become known by
everyone in the society.9° Customary law is flexible and can be
changed much more easily than the written law.
Traditional French scholarship, which has been consulted over the
years by scholars in interpreting Louisiana law, presents differing
opinions as to the source and enforcement of customary law. Some
scholars have argued that customs must necessarily arise from judges
who are ruling on disputes and enforcing general, unwritten rules
accepted in the society. Others have argued that customs come from
the people through general usage over time that is enforced through
some type of social sanction."
Professor TMte, a Louisiana law scholar, has indicated that the
Louisiana Civil Code contemplates that custom may arise from
judicial opinions, noting that the Louisiana Civil Code provisions on
custom stem more from Spanish law than French law.92 Commenting
on the meaning of custom in Louisiana, Professor TMe explained that
custom is established by "a practice or usage by the people in general,
and a common belief that this practice is necessary as required by
law."'93 After consideration of the Spanish law in Louisiana at the
time the early drafts of the Code were being written, he determined
that the meaning of custom includes customs that arise from the
judiciary's repeated enforcement of a rule.94
Louisiana courts have expressed a similar view. In Louisiana,
customs may arise from cases through the concept of "jurisprudence
constante," and from repeated practices, typically in contracts and
90. Loussouarn, supra note 49, at 250.
91. See Planiol, supra note 19, at 9 & n.6. Professor Planiol has described
custom as the rules that governed particular areas in France that were at some point
in the 1500s written down (in some ways similar to the Restatements of United
States law, which is drafted by the American Law Institute). He distinguishes
written law, which is enacted by legislatures, from customary law, which he says
must necessarily arise from judges who are ruling on disputes. Id.
92. T&e, supra note 22, at 2, 7-9, 12.
93. Id. at 12 (citing Loussouarn, supra note 49, at 248).
94. Id.
95. "[Ilt is only when courts consistently recognize a long-standing rule of law
outside of legislative expression that the rule of law will become part of Louisiana's
custom under Civil Code article 3 and be enforced as the law of the state." Doerr
v. Mobil Oil Corp., 2000-0947 (La. 2000), 774 So. 2d 119, 129; see also Eubanks
v. Brasseal, 310 So. 2d 550, 555 (La. 1975) (Barham, J. concurring). But note that
not all doctrines or decisions pronounced by the courts over time that become
jurisprudence constante are considered to rise to the level of custom. See also
Dennis, supra note 14, at 3 n.7; A.N. Yiannopoulos, Jurisprudence and Doctrine
as Sources of Law in Louisiana and in France, in The Role of Judicial Decisions
and Doctrine 69, 79 (Joseph Dainow ed., 1974). But see Prytania Park Hotel, Ltd.
v. Gen. Star Indem. Co., 179 F.3d 169, 175 (5th Cir. 1999) ("Jurisprudence, even
when it rises to the level ofjurisprudence constante, is a secondary law source in
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business transactions, that have not been recognized by the judiciary,
but have become accepted practices. 96 Custom cannot abrogate or
modify statutory law, nor can it create an obligation or alter an
express contract.97 Custom can, however, serve to clarify ambiguities
in contracts. 98
Because of these restrictions on custom and because so much of
Louisiana law has been set forth in enacted law, few modem
examples exist in which the courts have expressly cited custom as the
basis for their decisions.99
C. Equity
In the absence of legislation and custom, the Civil Code directs
judges to "proceed according to equity. To decide equitably, resort
is made to justice, reason, and prevailing usages."'" Scholars have
questioned precisely what constitutes the absence of legislation and
custom such that a gap exists, noting that a gap is often the result of
judicial interpretation of the legislature's intent.'' Professor Palmer
noted that a judge may find a "gap" when 1) the existing law is silent
on an issue that is presented by a case or 2) a law exists that could
govern the issue presented by the case, but the judge believes the law
was not intended to cover that issue either because the issue was not
contemplated when the legislation was enacted or the application of
the law to the particular case would work an injustice." Of course,
to find many of these "gaps"the judge must first conclude or presume
Louisiana.").
96. See, e.g., Terrell v. Alexandria Auto Co., 125 So. 757, 758-59 (La. App.
2d Cir. 1930) (in a contract dispute over what constituted delivery of a new car, the
court turned to custom to hold that a car was still considered new when driven by
the dealer from one dealership in the state to another for delivery to the buyer).
97. La. Civ. Code arts. 1, 3 (1999). See also Clement v. South Atlantic S.S.
Line, 128 La. 399, 401-02, 54 So. 920, 921 (La. 1911); Baton Rouge Union of
Police, Local 237 v. City of Baton Rouge, 696 So. 2d 642, 645 (La. App. 1st Cir.
1997).
98. See, e.g., Terrell v. Alexandria Auto Co., 125 So. 757, 759 (La. App. 2d
Cir. 1930); People's Bank & Trust Co. v. La. State Rice Milling Co., 119 So. 779,
780 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1929) (holding that custom or usage regularly followed by
two parties to contract became part of the contract and had the force of law).
99. See Mack E. Barham, A Renaissance ofthe Civilian Tradition in Louisiana,
in The Role of Judicial Decisions and Doctrine 38, 49 (Joseph Dainow ed., 1974)
(Custom does not play a major role as a source of law "in modem society as
frequently as it was when our Code was adopted."). See, e.g., Baton Rouge Union
of Police, 696 So. 2d at 645 (holding that custom that was contrary to legislation
could not be enforced); accord Clement, 128 La. at 401-02, 54 So. at 921.
100. La. Civ. Code art. 4.
101. Vernon V. Palmer, The Many Guises of Equity in a Mixed Jurisdiction: A
Functional View of Equity in Louisiana, 69 Tul. L. Rev. 7, 36-37, 39, 41 (1994).
102. Id. at 36-41.
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that the legislature was not intentionally silent on the issue or that the
legislature did not intentionally word the legislation such that it
would be interpreted broadly to cover the issue. °'
When resorting to equity, the Louisiana judge should keep the
Civil Code and other Louisiana enacted law at the forefront, first
consulting legislation for provisions that could be applied by analogy
because they govern similar interests and circumstances."°  An
example of this type of analysis that is often cited is the use of the
Civil Code provisions governing servitudes to decide cases involving
mineral rights before Louisiana had specific legislation governing
mineral rights. 105 When the Civil Code was enacted, the redactors did
not contemplate the oil and gas industry that would later develop in
Louisiana. The redactors did contemplate that use and ownership of
property could be separated, and these articles provided the
foundation on which the courts based their decisions concerning
mineral rights that could be owned or leased separately from the
ownership of the real property prior to the enactment of the Louisiana
Mineral Code. 10
6
When analogy is not available to the judge to determine the law,
some Louisiana law scholars have urged judges to follow French
legal scholar Francois Gfny's theory of "free scientific research" and
article 1 of the Swiss Civil Code.0 7 Under this theory the judge
would consider general principles and values implicit in the Civil
Code and other Louisiana enacted law and "render that decision
which he would propose if he were a legislator using his own
assessment of social, economic, and moral factors."'0 8 Despite some
opinions in which judges have utilized this method, the Code does not
require the judge to sit as legislator; Louisiana judges have looked to
many sources to guide their decisions based on equity, including prior
jurisprudence from Louisiana and other civil and common law
103. Id. at 39.
104. See, e.g., Langlois v. Allied Chem. Corp., 258 La. 1068, 1076-77,249 So.
2d 133, 137-38 (1971) (interpreting the meaning of the term "fault" in La. Civ.
Code Ann. art. 2315, the Court looked to other Civil Code provisions addressing
responsibility and standards of conduct), cited in Dennis, supra note 14, at 11-12;
see also Tate, supra note 6, at 675 (quoting Clarence Morrow, Louisiana Blueprint:
Civilian Codification andLegal Methodfor State and Nation, 17 Tul. L. Rev. 351,
549-54 (1943)).
105. See, e.g., Dennis, supra note 14, at 8 (citing Frost-Johnson Lumber Co. v.
Salting's Heirs, 150 La. 756, 91 So. 207 (1922)); Tucker, supra note 7, at 760-61.
106. See, e.g., Frost-Johnson Lumber Co., 150 La. 756, 91 So. 207.
107. See, e.g., Dennis, supra note 14, at 6-7 (citing Francois Gdny, Mdthode
d'Interprftation et Sources en Droit Priv6 Positif (La. State Law. Institute trans., 2d
ed. 1954) & Cc art. 1 (1907) (Switzerland)).
108. Id. at 13.
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jurisdictions, Louisiana doctrine, French doctrine, Roman sources, 10 9
and what Judge Albert Tate has termed "the judge's sense of
justice."' 
Interestingly, when Louisiana courts exercise their equitable
power to fill real or perceived gaps in the law, their decisions often
become de facto sources of law. Examples of equitable doctrines that
the Louisiana courts have applied to fill in "gaps" in the law and that
have become recognized as Louisiana law include "the principles of
unjust enrichment, equitable estoppel, and contra non valentem.""'
D. Judicial Decisions
Judicial decisions, or precedents, are not a primary source of law
in Louisiana according to the Louisiana Civil Code,112 though in
practice appellate court judicial decisions are persuasive as to what
the law is,"' and Louisiana Supreme Court decisions are considered
to be "binding" on the appellate and trial courts." 4 The doctrine of
stare decisis is not recognized in the Louisiana state court system.115
109. Palmer, supra note 101, at 32-33. See generally Albert Tate, Jr., The
"New" Judicial Solution: Occasions For and Limits to Judicial Creativity, 54 Tul.
L. Rev. 877 (1980).
110. Tate, supra note 109, at 913.
111. Palmer, supra note 101, at 31.
112. Id.
113. Times-Picayune Publ'g Corp. v. New Orleans Publ'g Group, Inc., 2000-
0748 (La. App. 4th Cir. 2002), 814 So. 2d 34, 36 (recognizing the value and
persuasiveness of appellate court decisions).
114. See, e.g., Pelican State Assocs., Inc. v. Winder, 253 La. 697, 706, 219 So.
2d 500, 503 (1969); United States Fid. & Guar. Co. v. Green, 252 La. 227,234,210
So. 2d 328, 331 (La. 1968). But see Ardoin, 360 So. 2d at 1334 (recognizing the
value of prior decisions in which a statute is interpreted, but noting that the prior
decisions are only "secondary information").
115. See Alvin B. Rubin, Hazards of a Civilian Venturer in Federal Court:
Travel and Travail on the Erie Railroad, 48 La. L. Rev. 1369, 1372 (1988); Doerr,
2000-0947 (La. 2000), 774 So. 2d at 128; Johnson v. St. Paul Mercury Ins. Co., 256
La. 289, 296, 236 So. 2d 216, 218 (1970), overruled on other grounds, Jagers v.
Royal Indem. Co., 276 So. 2d 309, 312 (La. 1973); McKellar v. Mason, 159 So. 2d
700 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1964); Ardoin v. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co., 360 So.
2d 1331 (La. 1978); City of Shreveport v. Baylock, 236 La. 133, 107 So. 2d 419
(1958); Bell v. Albert Hanson Lumber Co., 151 La. 824, 92 So. 350 (1922);
Belouguet v. Lanata, 13 La. Ann. 2 (La. 1858). In Miami Corp. v. State, the
Supreme Court declared that "[e]ven in regard to the rules of property the maxim
of stare decisis is not absolutely inflexible. . . . particularly . . when it is shown
that by following, rather than by disregarding previous erroneous decisions from
which an evil resulted, the community would suffer greater damage." 186 La. 784,
801, 173 So. 315, 320 (La. 1937). See also Gulf Oil Corp. v. State Mineral Bd.,
317 So. 2d 576 (La. 1974); Carter v. Moore, 258 La. 921,248 So. 2d 813 (1971);
Stevens v. State Mineral Bd., 255 La. 857, 233 So. 2d 542 (La. 1970); State v.
Cenac, 132 So. 2d 928 (La. 1961).
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The most comparable doctrine expressly recognized in Louisiana is
the doctrine of jurisprudence constante, or settled jurisprudence.
Unlike Stare decisis, this latter doctrine does not contemplate
adherence to a principle of law announced and applied on a
single occasion in the past. However, when, by repeated
decisions in a long line of cases, a rule of law has been
accepted and applied by the courts, these adjudications
assume the dignity of Jurisprudence constante; and the rule of
law upon which they are based is entitled to great weight in
subsequent decisions.' 1
6
Several commentators have also recognized that in civil law
jurisdictions, precedent has a "moral impact" or sometimes may serve
to morally bind courts, even though it does not technically bind
them. "7
Explaining how a court should interpret and apply Louisiana law
in a case in which the interpretation of two Civil Code articles and a
revised statute was at issue, the Louisiana Supreme Court wrote that
a court should first look to the Code and other legislative sources for
provisions that are directly applicable, then for provisions that are
relevant by analogy." 8 The court should consider prior decisions as
secondary information, "which may or may not reflect the meaning
of the laws for contemporary purposes."" The Court criticized the
appellate court for following one of the Supreme Court's own prior
But see Heinick v. Jefferson Parish Sch. Bd., 97-579 (La. App. 5th Cir. 1997),
701 So. 2d 1047, 1050 (stating, "[W]here a question is not regulated by statute, the
law is what the Louisiana Supreme Court has announced it to be."). In Heinick,
despite the court's recognition of the use of jurisprudence constante and not stare
decisis in Louisiana, the court concluded that it was "constrained to follow a
supreme court decision dispositive of the issue before us." Id. See also Higgins v.
State, 627 So. 2d 217 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1993) (the court recognized the doctrine
of stare decisis and held that the policies in favor of following stare decisis far
outweighed those suggesting departure); St. Martin Land Co. v. Pinckney, 212 La.
605, 33 So. 2d 169 (1947); Garret v. Pioneer Prod. Corp., 390 So. 2d 851 (La.
1980); Vaughan v. Housing Auth. ofNew Orleans, 80 So. 2d 561 (La. App. 1955);
Lacour v. Ford Inv. Corp., 183 So. 2d 463 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1966).
116. Johnson, 256 La. at 296, 236 So. 2d at 218.
117. See, e.g., Jean-Louis Baudoin, Impact of the Common Law on the Civilian
Systems in Louisiana and Quebec, in The Role of Judicial Decisions and Doctrine
in Civil Law and In Mixed Jurisdictions 1, 12 (Joseph Dainow ed., 1974); see also
Spurlock v. Prudential Ins. Co., 448 So. 2d 218 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1984); City of
New Orleans v. Treen, 421 So. 2d 282 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1982) (stating, "[W]hile
this court has the power to modify and overrule its former decisions, it does not do
so unless it is clearly demonstrated that error has occurred and hardship and
injustice will attend a continuation of the rule of law.").
118. Ardoin, 360 So. 2d at 1334-36.
119. Id. at 1334, 1336.
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decisions and treating it as primary authority when civilian
methodology called for a reexamination of the legislation. 20
The Ardoin decision illustrates the more traditional civilian
approach or methodology; however, it does not accurately reflect the
methodology most often used by Louisiana courts. Like the Court in
Ardoin, Louisiana courts usually begin their analysis of a legal issue
by consulting enacted law for any applicable provisions. However,
the courts often place great value on prior decisions of the Supreme
Court, a practice the Supreme Court criticized in Ardoin.
The value of precedent in Louisiana, like the value of precedent
in France, Italy, and Spain, increases with the level of the court
rendering the decision in the hierarchy of the court system. As
previously mentioned, the Louisiana Constitution entrusts the
Louisiana Supreme Court with supervisory jurisdiction over both civil
and criminal cases, and the Louisiana courts of appeal have appellate
jurisdiction over civil and criminal cases that arise from the courts
within their circuits.12" ' In civil cases, the Supreme Court has the
authority to review cases on both questions of law and fact.'22
Because of this court structure and the power of review, lower courts
are aware of the fact that if they do not follow a higher court's
interpretation of Louisiana law, they run the risk of reversal.
Likewise, attorneys and litigants are aware that courts tend to decide
cases consistently with their own decisions and the decisions of the
courts to which their decisions are appealable. Thus, although legal
decisions are not a source of law, they frequently are persuasive to
Louisiana courts and other courts interpreting Louisiana law.
I refer to this practice as "systemic respect for jurisprudence"
because the value of precedent varies with the level of the court, and
precedential value is not completely dependent on the existence of a
long line of cases, like jurisprudence constante, though a long line of
cases may increase its value. In fact, despite the judicial recognition
of the applicability of the doctrine ofjurisprudence constante and not
stare decisis, the Louisiana Supreme Court and all Louisiana appellate
courts have asserted that Louisiana Supreme Court decisions are
binding statements of Louisiana law that must be followed by all
other Louisiana state courts.'23 This binding effect is not dependent
120. Id. at 1334.
121. La. Const. art. 5, §§ 5(A) & 10(A). See also supra notes 76-77. The
courts of appeal also have jurisdiction over matters appealed from family and
juvenile courts. La. Const. art. 5, § 10(A).
122. Id. art. 5, § 5(C). See Times-Picayune Publ'g Corp. v. New Orleans Publ'g
Group, Inc., 2000-0748 (La. App. 4th Cir. 2002), 814 So. 2d 34.
123. See infra notes 125-156 and accompanying text for a discussion of




on the existence of a long line of cases. Further, as is revealed in the
survey results discussed in section IV of this article, the majority of
Louisiana appellate and district court judges participating in the
survey believe that they are bound by Louisiana Supreme Court
decisions. 124
The Louisiana Supreme Court decision most often cited in
support of this assertion is Pelican State Associates, Inc. v. Winder, 25
a case in which the Supreme Court was resolving an apparent split
among the Louisiana appellate courts of appeal as to the proper
interpretation of several Louisiana Civil Code articles. The court
explained, "While the appellate courts of this state are bound to
follow decisions of this court, decisions of courts of other
jurisdictions as well as those of courts of appeal of this state, while
persuasive are not controlling on this court. 126 This statement was
reiterated by the Court in Johnson v. St. Paul Mercury Insurance
Co., 27 a case often cited for the proposition that Louisiana recognizes
the doctrine of jurisprudence constante and rejects the doctrine of
stare decisis. In Johnson, the Court faced an appeal from the court of
appeal's decision to employ a doctrine other than the one consistently
used by Louisiana courts, including the Supreme Court, for
determining choice of law. The Court expressed its surprise over the
appellate court's failure to follow the "settled jurisprudence" and
described the appellate court's action as "a failure by the Second
Circuit to recognize its obligation to follow the settled law of this
State." 28 The Court explained that when a question is not regulated
by statute, "the law is what this Court has announced it to be."' 29
Although the Supreme Court has not reiterated this position in
more recent cases, and in fact the Court has spoken of judicial
decisions as secondary authority, 3° the Louisiana Courts of Appeal
have consistently referred to Louisiana Supreme Court decisions as
binding statements of the law. For example, in State v. Cenac,'3' the
First Circuit Court of Appeal expressed its astonishment at the State's
argument that the court had the "power and authority" to overrule a
124. See Appendix, questions 13 & 14.
125. 253 La. 697, 219 So. 2d 500 (1969).
126. Id. at 503. See also United States Fid. & Guar. Co. v. Green, 252 La. 227,
234, 210 So. 2d 328, 331 (1968), overruled on other grounds by Creech v. Capitol
Mack, Inc., 287 So. 2d 497 (La. 1974) ("[T]he appellate courts of this state are
bound to follow a decision of this court.").
127. 256 La. 289, 236 So. 2d 216 (1970), overruled on other grounds, Jagers
v. Royal Indem. Co., 276 So. 2d 309, 312 (La.1973).
128. Id. at 217.
129. Id. at217-18.
130. See supra note 112.
131. 132 So. 2d 897, 899 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1961), overruled on other grounds,
Gulf Oil Corp. v. State Mineral Bd., 317 So. 2d 576 (La. 1975) (on rehearing).
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line of decisions, including Supreme Court decisions, interpreting a
Louisiana Revised statute. Even though the State had argued that the
existing line of decisions "may lead to absurd consequences," the
court refused to recognize its power under the more flexible
jurisprudence constante, citing the Supreme Court's supervisory
jurisdiction as a restriction on the appellate courts to ever decide
differently from that court.'32 The court explained:
It is too clear to admit of argument that one of the primary
functions of a superior court whether acting under its direct
appellate or supervisory jurisdiction via writ is to enumerate
definitive interpretations of law binding upon and controlling
subsequent decisions of all inferior courts thereto. It is an
elementary, basic principle of law that inferior courts are
bound by the decisions of superior, supervisory tribunals.'33
Similarly, the appellate court in Phillips v. Neraux134 expressed its
desire to strike down as unconstitutional a "judicially created"
evidentiary rule, but it did not do so because it felt constrained to
follow the Louisiana Supreme Court. The court did not mention the
doctrine ofjurisprudence constante; rather, it quoted one of its earlier
opinions in which it explained:
Where the jurisprudence is clear and unmistakable, this court
has no authority to change the policy thereby established. In
such instances, it is the duty of intermediate appellate courts
to follow the law as established by the decisions of the
Supreme Court. ... Assuming, arguendo, we disagreed with
the jurisprudence in this regard, we are compelled to follow
what is obviously a clear expression of our Supreme Court.135
Expressly stating that it did not have the power to overrule the
Supreme Court, it relied on the Supreme Court's decision in Johnson
v. St. Paul Mercury Insurance Co. as a lecture to intermediate
appellate courts that they are bound to follow Supreme Court
decisions and that "in the absence of statute, the law is what the
Supreme Court says it is. "136
More recently, the First Circuit Court of Appeal had occasion to
repeat this principle when it faced an argument by one party, Exxon
Corporation, to employ a test different from the test announced by the
132. Id. at 899-900.
133. Id. at 900.
134. 357 So. 2d 813, 820 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1978).
135. Id. (quoting O'Connor v. Terry, 346 So. 2d 739, 743 (La. App. 1st Cir.
1977)).
136. Id. at 820-21 (citing Johnson v. St. Paul Mercury Ins. Co., 256 La. 289,
236 So. 2d 216 (1970)).
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Louisiana Supreme Court and followed in several other cases to
evaluate the excessiveness of a damage award.'37 The court noted
that the test Exxon advocated was the test used prior to the Supreme
Court's decision on the issue, but explained that it was not free to
look to the earlier decisions for guidance because it was "bound to
follow the instructions of the Louisiana Supreme Court.'
138
The Second Circuit Court of Appeal has also restated the
principle that it is bound to follow Louisiana Supreme Court
decisions. In Lucky v. Fricks,'39 the court acknowledged the potential
merit in the party's argument that it should not interpret Louisiana
law as the Supreme Court had in the past, but it concluded that it was
not free to interpret the law differently. The court explained:
Trial courts and courts of appeal are bound to follow the last
expression of law of the Louisiana Supreme Court.... The
time may be ripe to change the rule that there is no cause of
action in Louisiana for intentional interference with contracts.
... We, however, are powerless to make this change. 4°
Similarly, the Second Circuit Court of Appeal reiterated this
position in Mudd v. Christus Health Northern Louisiana"' when it
responded to an argument by one of the parties that the Supreme
Court had incorrectly interpreted Louisiana law and that its decision
on the issue should be overruled. The court explained that it was not
free to disregard the Supreme Court's statement of the law on the
issue because "the appellate courts of the state are bound to follow the
decisions of the state supreme court."' 42 Interestingly, shortly after
the Second Circuit's decision in Mudd, the Supreme Court in another
case overruled the decision the party in Mudd had suggested was
incorrect, which is what caused the Supreme Court to grant writs in
Mudd and remand to the trial court for reconsideration in light of its
newest decision. 143  Thus, even though one of the parties was
advocating what ultimately was determined to be the proper
137. Roberts v. Owens-Coming Fiberglas Corp., 2003-0248 (La. App. 1st Cir.
2004), 878 So. 2d 631.
138. Id. at 644 (citing Pelican State Assocs., Inc. v. Winder, 253 La. 697, 706,
219 So. 2d 500, 503 (1969)). See also Elliot v. District Attorney of Baton Rouge,
94-1804 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1995), 664 So. 2d 122.
139. 511 So. 2d 1315, 1317 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1987).
140. Id. (citations omitted).
141. 37, 133 (La. App. 2d Cir. 2003), 850 So. 2d 911, 916, writ granted &
remanded to trial court, 2003-2098 (La. 2003), 857 So. 2d 507.
142. Id. at 916.
143. Mudd, 857 So. 2d at 507 (citing David v. Our Lady of the Lake Hospital,
Inc., 2002-2675 (La. 2003), 849 So. 2d 38, in which the court overruled its
decision in Williams v. Jackson Parish Hosp., 2000-3170 (La. 2001), 798 So. 2d
921).
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interpretation of Louisiana law, the Second Circuit did not even
evaluate the argument because of its belief that it was powerless to
decide a case contrary to the Supreme Court.
The Third Circuit Court of Appeal has recognized the binding
effect of Supreme Court decisions, but on at least one occasion it has
acted contrary to Supreme Court jurisprudence,'" highlighting the
confusion existing among Louisiana courts as to how to employ the
doctrine of jurisprudence constante as opposed to stare decisis, and
still honor the hierarchy of the Louisiana court system. In Clavier v.
Lay Down Service, Inc.,'45 the court discussed the binding effect of
Supreme Court decisions much like the other Louisiana circuits.
Faced with a question of interpretation of a Louisiana Revised
Statute, the district court in the case had expressly referred to a
Supreme Court decision on the issue as "'an erroneous
pronouncement of Louisiana law,"' and neglected to follow it.'46 The
Third Circuit agreed with the trial court's interpretation. However,
the court explained,
[W]e feel constrained to follow the supreme court's decision
in Kirkland. As a court of appeal, we are bound to follow the
decisions of our supreme court. "In our judicial system the
Court of Appeal, in its relation to the Supreme Court,
occupies the status of an inferior court, therefore, we do not
enjoy the prerogative individually or collectively of either
criticizing or reversing a decision of that court, even if it
should be obviously erroneous. ,147
This language was quoted again by the Third Circuit in Anthony
Crane Rental v. Fruge, a case noted here not only because the court
acted under the premise that it was bound by Louisiana Supreme
Court decisions, but also because after the Third Circuit ruled
consistently with the Louisiana Supreme Court decision with which
it disagreed, the Louisiana Supreme Court overruled the relied upon
decision and reversed the Third Circuit's decision. After a well-
reasoned discussion of the statute at issue, the Supreme Court
overruled its earlier interpretation of the statute because it had read a
requirement into the statute that did not exist.'49 Had the Third
144. See infra notes 157-163 and accompanying text for a discussion of the
referenced case.
145. 00-00701 (La. App. 3d Cir. 2000), 776 So. 2d 634.
146. Id. at 637.
147. Id. at 638 (quoting Fouchaux v. Board of Commr's of Port ofNew Orleans,
65 So. 2d 430, 432 (La. App. Orleans 1953)).
148. 02-0635 (La. App. 3d Cir. 2002), 833 So. 2d 1070, 1079, reversed, 2003-
0115 (La. 2003), 859 So. 2d 631.
149. Anthony Crane Rental, 859 So. 2d at 639.
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Circuit not felt bound or constrained by the Supreme Court's
decision, perhaps it could have properly interpreted the statute.
The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeal seems to abide by the
principle that it is bound by Supreme Court decisions, though the
court has indicated that in some circumstances it may have the power
to rule differently from Supreme Court precedent. In one case, citing
its earlier decisions, the court stated, "[T]he law is settled that this
appellate court is bound to follow the decisions of our Supreme
Court."'' ° Applying this principle, the court followed an earlier
Supreme Court decision and rejected reliance on a federal district
court decision, which it noted was merely persuasive. 5'
On the other hand, the Fourth Circuit has indicated that in some
circumstances it may have the power to overrule or decide differently
from a Supreme Court decision. In State v. South Central Bell
Telephone Co.,' 52 faced with an argument based on a prior Supreme
Court decision rendered in 1899, the court referred to prior decisions
as "persuasive, but not conclusive since they can be overruled or
distinguished." The court tempered this statement with an
admonition that prior Supreme Court decisions should be followed
unless some compelling reason exists for "changing the law."' 53
The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeal decisions in which the value of
the Supreme Court decisions is mentioned are consistent with the
other circuits. In one case, the court was faced with a challenge to the
interpretation of Louisiana Civil Code article 3492, which permits
prescription to run on a minor's tort claim during his minority. '54 The
court explained, "Although we sympathize with the plaintiff and
believe that it may well be time to change our rule, as an intermediate
appellate court we are bound to follow the precedent set by our
Supreme Court."' 55  The court reasoned that any change in the
150. Chittenden v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 98-2919 (La. App. 4th Cir.
2000), 748 So. 2d 641,644. See also Burger v. Burger, 1181-82 (La. App. 4th Cir.
1978), 357 So. 2d 1178 (noting the potential merit of an argument asserted by one
party for a particular interpretation of Louisiana Civil Code article 2324 , but
recognizing that it remained beyond the court's power to overrule an earlier
Supreme Court decision).
151. Chittenden, 748 So. 2d at 644.
152. 619 So. 2d 749, 753 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1993).
153. Id.
154. Gauthreaux v. Rheem Mfg Co., 588 So. 2d 723, 725 (La. App. 5th Cir.
1991).
155. Id. See also Heinick v. Jefferson Parish Sch. Bd., 97-579 (La. App. 5th
Cir. 1997), 701 So. 2d 1047, 1050 (stating, "[W]here a question is not regulated by
statute, the law is what the Louisiana Supreme Court has announced it to be.". In
Heinick, despite the court's recognition of the use of jurisprudence constante and
not stare decisis in Louisiana, the court concluded that it was "constrained to follow
a supreme court decision dispositive ofthe issue before us."); State v. Serio,94-131
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existing law "must come from the legislature or our Supreme
Court."'15 6 This last sentence indicates some belief by the court that
the Supreme Court, along with the legislature, has the power to
change or amend the law. Pursuant to traditional civilian treatment
of precedent, the courts do have the power to "change" the law
through reexamination and reinterpretation of the enacted provisions,
but this power belongs to all courts, not just the court of last resort.
Despite the above decisions, from time to time Louisiana
appellate courts have followed a more traditional definition of
jurisprudence constante, giving a long line of prior decisions great
respect, but not binding power. The Third Circuit Court of Appeal in
LeJeune v. Rayne Branch Hospital57 chose not to follow the
Louisiana Supreme Court's interpretation of tort law concerning
recovery for mental anguish resulting from injury to another. The
appellate court's thoughtful and well-researched opinion is a
testament to the great respect paid to the decisions of the Supreme
Court, yet the court exercised its power to reexamine the Louisiana
Civil Code article at the heart of the issue. Dissatisfied with the
jurisprudence interpreting Louisiana Civil Code article 2315 as not
allowing claims for damages for mental anguish resulting from injury
to a third person, which was originally set forth in Black v.
Carrollton" in 1855, the court considered the following before
making its decision: (1) the long line of cases that had followed
Black, which included three Louisiana Supreme Court decisions; 59
(2) the few "maverick" appellate court decisions that had carved out
exceptions to Black; (3) the many appellate court decisions in which
the courts followed Black, but openly criticized it; (4) the many writ
applications denied by the Supreme Court in which the issue was
raised; (5) the recovery allowed in analogous circumstances,
including a recent discussion by the Supreme Court on a related issue;
(6) a recent amendment to the code provision at issue; (7) the writings
of commentators on the issue; and (8) common law approaches to the
(La. App. 5th Cir. 1994), 641 So. 2d 604, 607 (although a criminal case, the court
cited Pelican State Assocs., Inc. v. Winder, 253 La. 697, 706, 219 So. 2d 500, 503
(1969), for the principle that an appellate court is bound to follow the decisions of
the Louisiana Supreme Court even if it disagrees with the Supreme Court's
interpretation of the law); Duhe v. Duhe, 466 So. 2d 595, 597 (La. App. 5th Cir.
1985) (explaining that even though a Supreme Court decision had been criticized
by several courts of appeal, the court was bound by the prior Supreme Court
decision).
156. Gauthreaux, 588 So. 2d at 725.
157. 539 So. 2d 849 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1989).
158. 10 La. Ann 33 (La. 1855).
159. Kaufman v. Clark, 141 La. 316, 75 So. 65 (1917); Brinkman v. St. Landry




issue. 6' Accepting its responsibility to reexamine the interpretation
of the Civil Code article at issue, the court explained, "Developments
in the law of torts, particularly in recent years, lead us to believe that
the Black rule should be discarded, if it has not already been
abandoned."'' The court held that the policy reasons underlying the
Black line of decisions were "no longer valid," and it allowed the
plaintiffs to maintain a cause of action that had been denied under
Louisiana law for at least the past 134 years.
62
On review, the Supreme Court reassessed its position regarding
this issue, affirmed the appellate court's decision, and overruled
Black.163  Like the appellate court, the Supreme Court also
thoughtfully considered prior Louisiana jurisprudence, the
development of tort law in other states in the United States, and
scholarly writings on the issue. Interestingly, the Supreme Court's
opinion is silent as to the propriety of the appellate court's action of
rendering a decision that was contrary to existing jurisprudence.
Thus, while the Supreme Court has endorsed use of a more
traditional civilian approach, which relegates prior decisions to a
secondary status that simply shows how the law has been interpreted
and which is consistent with the Louisiana Civil Code, the Court has
also directed lower courts to follow its decisions as binding
statements of the law. This contradiction has come from the courts'
struggle to remain true to the civilian tradition and the Louisiana Civil
Code provisions regarding sources of law and, at the same time,
recognize the superior position of the Louisiana Supreme Court to
lower state courts, which is set forth by the Louisiana Constitution.
IV. SURVEY OF LOUISIANA JUDGES
A survey of Louisiana state judges further identified and clarified
the sources of law actually used in modem day Louisiana and the
value of precedent."64 The focus of the survey was on the sources
cited by attorneys when arguing to the courts and on the sources on
which the courts rely when deciding cases. The survey also inquired
about the court's respect for precedent, and its power to reject
precedent.
A copy of the survey was sent by mail to the seven Louisiana
Supreme Courtjustices, fifty-three Louisiana Court of Appeal judges,
and 220 Louisiana district court judges.'65 Judges were not
160. Lejeune, 539 So. 2d at 851-59.
161. Id. at 850.
162. Id. at 859.
163. LeJeune v. Rayne Branch Hosp., 556 So. 2d 559, 569 (La. 1990).
164. See Appendix to this article for a copy of the survey and results.
165. The goal was to send a survey to all Louisiana state judges who serve at the
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compensated for their participation in the survey. Participation in the
survey was voluntary. One hundred and nineteen Louisiana district
court judges, or 54% of Louisiana district court judges, responded to
the survey; thirty-one Louisiana Court of Appeal judges, or 58% of
Louisiana Court of Appeal judges, responded to the survey; and no
Louisiana Supreme Court justices responded to the survey. Most of
the judges who responded to the survey received their legal education
in Louisiana and stated that they received an excellent (66%) or
adequate (30%) background in the methodology of civil law analysis.
The responding judges represented a range of experience as Louisiana
state court judges, with 22.6% serving for less than five years, 30%
serving for five to ten years,22% serving for ten to fifteen years, and
25.3% serving for more than fifteen years.
When it came to identifying "sources," both primary and
secondary, that the judges indicated attorneys cite to the court as
authority for their arguments, the numbers did not differ much
whether the attorneys' arguments were based on the Louisiana Civil
Code or the Louisiana Constitution or other Louisiana enacted law. 166
When arguing before the courts most attorneys rely on prior
Louisiana court decisions to support their arguments-89.6% for
arguments based on the Civil Code and 84.4 % for arguments based
on the Louisiana Constitution and other Louisiana enacted law. In
contrast, most attorneys do not rely heavily on legal treatises and law
review articles in their arguments to the courts. While 39.7% and
41.2% of attorneys sometimes rely on these sources for arguments
based on the Civil Code and arguments based on other Louisiana
enacted law, respectively, most attorneys rely on these sources seldom
or never-59.5% and 57.4%, respectively.
As for the "value" attributed to prior decisions by attorneys
arguing before Louisiana courts, the judges indicated that attorneys
out a high value on such decisions, especially when the Louisiana
Supreme Court has weighed in on the issue. When relying on a line
of decisions, which includes at least one Louisiana Supreme Court
decision, most attorneys either always or almost always argue that the
court is bound to follow the line of decisions-80.6% of attorneys
district court level and higher. Names and addresses were obtained primarily from
the 2002 edition of the Louisiana Legal Directory, which is the "official directory
of the Louisiana State Bar Association," with a few additions or deletions based on
information gathered about newly elected judges and recent retirements.
166. All but two questions inquiring into the sources that attorneys cite to the
courts as authority for their arguments begin with the express premise that the issue
was governed by enacted law-either the Louisiana Constitution, Civil Code, or
Louisiana statutes. See Appendix, questions 4-9 and 12-13. Questions 9 and 13




when prior decisions interpret the Civil Code and 79.5% when prior
decisions interpret Louisiana enacted law other than the Civil Code.
The numbers change somewhat when attorneys rely on a line of
decisions that includes at least one decision from the Louisiana Court
of Appeal in which they are arguing or to which an appeal would be
brought. In those cases, 70.2% of attorneys always or almost always
argue to the court that it is bound to or must follow the line of
decisions interpreting the Civil Code, and 66.6% of attorneys always
or almost always argue to the court that it is bound to or must follow
the line of decisions interpreting the Louisiana Constitution or other
Louisiana enacted law.
Similarly, after enacted law, most judges turn to prior court
decisions to determine applicable Louisiana law.'67 If an issue is
apparently not governed by Louisiana enacted law, 83.87% of the
appellate court judges indicated that they would rely on prior
decisions of Louisiana state courts to guide their decisions, and
85.47% of state district court judges would do the same. 68 In
response to this same question, assuming the absence of enacted law,
most judges would also consider Louisiana enacted laws that govern
analogous or similar issues-70.9% of appellate court judges and
77.77% of district court judges; a legal treatise or law review
article-70.9% of appellate court judges and 62.39% of district court
.judges, and equity--51.6% of appellate court judges and 57.26% of
district court judges. 69 In addition, 67.74% of the appellate court
.judges would consider prior decisions of courts other than Louisiana
state courts, and 43.58% of district court judges would consider these
other state courts' decisions.
Interestingly, despite its identification by the legislature in the
Civil Code as a source of law, only 25.8% of the appellate court
judges and 35% of the district court judges identified custom as
something they would rely on to guide them in decisionmaking.
These results are consistent with the fact that few modern examples
exist in which the Louisiana courts have expressly cited custom as the
basis for their decisions. Perhaps they are also explained by the fact
that unlike France, where custom was the primary source of law for
167. See Appendix questions 23-25; see also questions 10-11, 14-18, & 20.
168. See Appendix, question 23.
169. See id.; see also Appendix question 21 (concerning use of legal treatises or
law review articles). In response to the question regarding how often the judge's
decisions are influenced by legal treatises or law review articles, 54.83% of the
appellate court judges indicated the response "sometimes," and 56.7% of the district
court judges indicated the response "sometimes." Only 12.9% ofthe appellate court
judges indicated "almost always" and none indicated "always." An even smaller
influence of legal treatises and law review articles was indicated by the district court
judges with .84% or one judge out of 118 respondents indicating "almost always"
and .84% or one other judge indicating "always."
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hundreds of years, Louisiana drafted its first Civil Code a relatively
short time after its purchase by the United States, eliminating the
necessity for courts to turn to custom in most circumstances.
Moreover, in present day Louisiana where all appellate court and
Supreme Court decisions are published and people customarily put
agreements and expectations in writing, courts turn to prior decisions
for information on how to interpret enacted law or how to fill the
interstices left by enacted law and turn to other writings to determine
the intentions of parties. This reliance on precedent, especially
jurisprudence constante, is arguably a reliance on custom, which
"results from practice repeated for a longtime and generally accepted
as having acquired the force of law,""' and which the Louisiana
judges have more than likely identified in the survey by indicating a
reliance on prior decisions.
This reliance on prior decisions is strong, even when enacted law
exists, to the point that Louisiana Supreme Court decisions are
considered binding by the appellate and district courts, confirming
what was found from a review of the reported cases on the value of
decisions. 7' The majority of judges responding to the survey
indicated that they did not consider it within their power and authority
to overrule a Louisiana Supreme Court decision interpreting
Louisiana enacted law even if they believed that the Supreme Court
had incorrectly interpreted the law. Of the appellate court judges,
83.87% indicated that they could not overrule the Supreme Court, and
81.89% of the district court judges indicated the same. 172 On the
other hand, the majority of the courts do not feel bound by their own
prior decisions interpreting Louisiana enacted law, with 67.74% of
appellate court judges and 90.9% of district court judges indicating
that they consider it within their power and authority to overrule a
decision of their own court that they believe incorrectly interpreted
the Louisiana Civil Code. 173
Perhaps reflective of the above beliefs, one experienced Louisiana
Court of Appeal judge added this comment to his survey responses:
As you know, in a civilian system there is no such thing as
precedent. It is jurisprudence constante, a different thing
entirely. I think we Louisiana judges sometimes take the easy
170. La. Civ. Code. art. 3 (1999).
171. See supra part III.D.
172. See Appendix questions 14 & 15.
173. See Appendix question 10. Question 11 asked the same question about
Louisiana enacted law other than the Civil Code and the responses were similar,
with 66.66% of appellate court judges and 90.3% of district court judges indicating
that they consider it within their power and authority to overrule a decision of their
own court that they believe incorrectly interpreted the Louisiana Constitution or
Louisiana enacted law other than the Civil Code.
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way out: if we can find a single intermediate appellate court
decision on the subject, we will apply it to our issue as though
it has the force of law. When we do so, we are giving that
decision the effect of "precedent.'
' 74
This same judge indicated that intermediate appellate court judges
consider themselves bound by Louisiana Supreme Court decisions,
but not by decisions of other courts of appeal.
Finally, the judges nearly unanimously recognized a respect for
prior decisions when they indicated that if they chose not to follow a
relevant line of decisions, which included opinions rendered by their
court or a court to which their decision would be appealable, they
would either explicitly indicate that they were overruling precedent
and explain why or distinguish the case they were deciding from the
line of decisions. One hundred percent of the appellate court judges
responding would do one of the above, rejecting the option of not
mentioning the line of decisions or giving it little mention 98.27% of
the district court judges responding would do one of the above with
1.73% of judges indicating that they would not mention the line of
decisions or would give it little mention.'75
V. COMMENTS, RECOMMENDATIONS, AND CONCLUSIONS
The research discussed in this article leads me to several
conclusions regarding the sources of law in Louisiana and the value
of precedent. No one can dispute that enacted law is the primary
source of law in Louisiana. It is recognized as a source of law in the
Civil Code and by the courts. Some questions arise, though, as to the
value of custom as a source of law. The Civil Code expressly
recognizes it as a source of law, and courts have consistently
identified it as a source of law. However, in modem times, courts
have rarely identified custom as the basis for their decisions, and the
majority of Louisiana judges do not identify custom as something
they would rely on to guide them in decision-making.
In contrast to custom, precedent, or prior decisions by Louisiana
state courts, which some commentators and courts argue may rise to
the level of custom after achieving the status of jurisprudence
constante, are not recognized in the Civil Code as a primary source of
law, and Louisiana courts often state that they are not bound by
174. Survey Responses (on file with the author).
175. See id. The percentages noted above were based on responses to question
16, which pertained to decisions based on cases interpreting the Louisiana Civil
Code. The results in response to question 17 pertaining to other Louisiana enacted
law differed only slightly, with only .88%, or one judge, indicating that he would
not mention the line or give it little mention.
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precedent like their common law brothers. However, in modem
times, Louisiana courts have frequently identified precedent as a basis
for their decisions, and the majority of Louisiana judges identify
precedent as something they would rely on to guide them in
decisionmaking. Louisiana courts seem to be applying what I have
called "systemic respect for jurisprudence," a concept that includes
an aspect of stare decisis and an aspect of jurisprudence constante.
As described earlier, this concept contemplates a respect or value for
precedent or jurisprudence that is tied to the court hierarchy within
the legal system. The decisions of the highest court in the system,
which is the court of last resort, are considered statements of binding
law on all of the lower courts, subject to change only by the highest
court itself or the legislature, which is similar to the common law
concept of stare decisis. This court thereby provides some certainty
by providing the final interpretation of law for the jurisdiction.
Although the Louisiana Supreme Court has expressly limited the
value of prior decisions to secondary authorities, the Louisiana
Supreme Court and Louisiana appellate courts have expressly
recognized Louisiana Supreme Court decisions as binding on lower
Louisiana courts, thus "judicially" making these decisions a source of
law. In some cases, these decisions may attain their status as a source
of law because they have become custom through their repeated use,
and the Civil Code recognizes custom as a source of law. However,
the Louisiana courts that have held that Louisiana Supreme Court
decisions are binding have not restricted binding force to repeated
decisions; they recognize that one Louisiana Supreme Court decision
has binding force on the lower Louisiana courts.
Other Louisiana court decisions are not considered binding on any
court under the concept of "systemic respect for jurisprudence,"
which is the aspect of the concept that incorporates the doctrine of
jurisprudence constante. When no Louisiana Supreme Court decision
has been rendered on an issue, courts may consider prior decisions as
persuasive to their interpretation of the law; when repeated decisions
interpret the law in the same way, these adjudications assume the
dignity of jurisprudence constante, and the rule of law upon which
they are based is entitled to great weight in subsequent decisions.
Systemic respect forjurisprudence seems to describe the doctrine
that is being used in many civil law jurisdictions, including those
jurisdictions discussed herein-Louisiana, France, Spain, and Italy-
with varying degrees of recognition of the actual value of precedent.
Of the four mentioned, Louisiana has gone the furthest in judicially
recognizing the binding nature of decisions of its highest state court.
Spain has also recognized that decisions of its Tribunal Supremo are
binding on lower courts, but only when the court is settling the law
over which two or more of its appellate courts have reached differing
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interpretations. 76 In Italy, the lower courts are free to take a different
position on a legal issue from the position taken by the Corte di
Cassazione, but they are expected to adequately explain the reasons
for disregarding the high court's prior interpretation of the law.
Moreover, when a line of prior consistent decisions exists on an issue,
implicating the doctrine of "giurisprudenza constante" or
"consolidata," the Italian courts are bound by the interpretation except
for very good countervailing reasons.177
In the French system, the hierarchy of the courts also plays a role,
but that role has not been expressly formalized. Decisions of the
higher courts provide an "authoritative argument" to the lower courts
on how to interpret the statutory law, which some have described as
creating a "de facto obligation" on the lower courts to follow the prior
interpretations because the decisions of these lower courts will be
reviewed by the higher courts.'78
As for the reliance on doctrine and other secondary sources that
is traditionally associated with civil law jurisdictions, in Louisiana,
like in many other civil law jurisdictions, doctrine has been relegated
to a position behind enacted law and precedent. This makes perfect
sense from an historical perspective. Doctrine was a highly valued
secondary source that explained the law when court decisions were
not readily available, when court decisions were often not accurately
transcribed, and when courts did not always take the time to explain
their reasoning. In contrast, today the decisions of Louisiana courts,
as well as many other courts, are readily available, they are accurately
transcribed, and courts routinely explain their reasoning, thus making
them a valuable and easily obtainable resource for other courts.
The legal system and traditions of Louisiana, an arguably civil
law state in a common law nation, have adapted well. Louisiana has
remained true to its civil law traditions, which have allowed its law
to remain grounded in a strong statutory foundation, while at the same
time it has taken advantage of the availability of prior interpretations
of the law and has recognized their value. Some confusion seems to
exist among the Louisiana courts as to whether those prior
interpretations should ever bind the lower courts of the state. This
confusion could be resolved by enacting a provision to be added to
the Louisiana Civil Code similar to the provision in the Codigo Civil
of Spain recognizing the value of jurisprudence.'79 This provision
would codify "systemic respect forjurisprudence" by recognizing that
lower courts necessarily place a high value on the decisions of the
176. See supra notes 70-71 and accompanying text.
177. See supra notes 59-63 and accompanying text.
178. See supra notes 49-53 and accompanying text.
179. See supra text accompanying note 67.
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courts to which their decisions are appealable, but it would also
restrict those decisions from becoming "law." The provision might
read,
Jurisprudence of the courts shall serve as a complement to the
legislation, customs, and principles of equity, especially when
the jurisprudence has achieved the status of jurisprudence
constante. Interpretations of the law by the Louisiana
Supreme Court, whether they have achieved the status of
jurisprudence constante or not, are entitled to great weight,
though they do not create law and do not bind lower courts.
In earlier times, when civilian jurisdictions often relied on
unwritten sources of law, it may have been sufficient for courts to
reference the custom of using the doctrine ofjurisprudence constante
when considering prior judicial decisions. In Louisiana today,
codifying the value to be placed on prior judicial decisions would
clarify for the courts how they should value prior decisions and would
make this methodology a matter of law. This proposed codification
would also provide a workable model for civilian jurisdictions, like
those discussed herein, that seem to be grappling with the ever-
increasing availability and reliability of prior judicial decisions.
As Professor Theodore Plucknett wrote in his brilliant text on the
common law, "The conditions of society, and men's attitude towards
them, are slowly but constantly changing, and the law must do its best
to keep in harmony with contemporary life and thought."'80 Adopting
a provision such as the one proposed above would not only assist the
Louisiana legal system in keeping harmony with contemporary life
and thought, but it would also foster the preservation of civil law
methodology.
180. Plucknett, supra note 1, at 307.
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Appendix 1
Survey of Louisiana Judges
Regarding Sources Relied on to Decide Cases
Conducted by Professor Mary Garvey Algero
Loyola University, New Orleans, School of Law
This brief survey is meant to identify the sources relied on by Louisiana courts and the
attorneys who argue before the courts. The results of this survey will be an important
part of a law review article Professor Algero is preparing on the sources of Louisiana
law. Questions are addressed to issues of Louisiana state law. Responses will be
reported anonymously, but the level of court may be revealed when the level of court
is significant to the information being discussed. In addition to identifying the best
response to each question, you are strongly encouraged to provide comments relevant
to the questions. Your input as a Louisiana judge is vital to ensuring accurate data for
this project.
Please return the completed survey in the enclosed envelope by August 1, 2003. Any
questions about the survey should be directed to Professor Algero at (504)861-5675
or algero@loyno.edu or her assistant, Janice Burke, at (504)861-5749. Thank you for
your participation.
Instructions: Please circle the letter that corresponds to your response to each
question. Several lines for comments about questions or your responses have been
included following most questions.
1. Select the response that identifies the court on which you sit:
a. Louisiana Supreme Court;
b Louisiana Court of Appeal; La. App. 31 judges
c. Louisiana District Court. D. Ct. 119 judges
2. Select the response that identifies the number of years you have served as a
Louisiana state court judge:
a. Less than 5 years; La. App. 0% D. Ct. 28.57%
(34/119)
b. 5-10years; La. App. 9.67% (3/31) D. Ct. 35.29%
(42/119)
c. 10-15years; La. App. 29.03% (9/31) D. Ct. 20.16%
(24/119)
d. More than l5 years; La. App. 61.29% (19/31) D. Ct. 15.96%
(19/119)
816 LOUISIA NA LA W RE VIEW [Vol. 65
3. Select the response that best describes your legal educational background:
a. I attended a law school located in Louisiana, and I received an
excellent background in the methodology of civil law analysis;
La. App. 67.74% (21/31) D. Ct. 65.54% (78/119)
b. I attended a law school located in Louisiana, and I received an
adequate background in the methodology of civil law analysis;
La. App. 32.25% (10/31) D. Ct. 29.41% (35/119)
c. I attended a law school located in Louisiana, and I did not receive a
solid background in the methodology of civil law analysis;
La. App. 0% D. Ct. 2.52% (3/119)
d. I attended a law school located outside of Louisiana, and I received an
excellent background in the methodology of civil law analysis;
La. App. 0% D. Ct. .84% (1/119)
e. I attended a law school located outside of Louisiana, and I received
an adequate background in the methodology of civil law analysis;
La. App. 0% D. Ct. 1.68% (2/119)
f. I attended a law school located outside of Louisiana, and I did not
receive a solid background in the methodology of civil law analysis.
La. App. 0% D. Ct. 0%
4. How often do attorneys who argue before the court rely on prior Louisiana
court decisions to support their arguments when the arguments are based on the
Louisiana Civil Code? (The phrase "argue before the court," which is used
several times in this survey, should be read to include written arguments as well
as oral arguments.)
a. Always. La. App. 32.25% (10/31) D. Ct. 15.65%
(18/115)
b. Almost always. La. App. 61.29% (19/31) D. Ct. 7 3.04%
(84/115)
c. Sometimes. La. App. 6.45% (2/31) D. Ct. 7.82 (9/115)
d. Seldom. La. App. 0% D. Ct. 2.60% (3/115)
e. Never. La. App. 0% D. Ct. .86% (1/115)
5. How often do attorneys who argue before the court rely on prior Louisiana
court decisions to support their arguments when the arguments are based on the
Louisiana Constitution or Louisiana enacted law (other than the Civil Code)?
a. Always. La. App. 29.03% (9/31) D. Ct. 1 7.09%
(20/117)
b. Almost always. La. App. 58.06% (18/31) D. Ct. 66.66%
(78/117)
c. Sometimes. La. App. 12.9% (4/31) D. C t. 1 2.8 9 %
(15/117)
d. Seldom. La. App. 0% D. Ct. 3.41% (4/117)
e. Never. La. App. 0% D. Ct. 0%
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6. How often do attorneys who argue before the court rely on legal treatises or
law review articles to support their arguments when the arguments are based
on the Louisiana Civil Code?
a. Always. La. App. 0% D. Ct. 0%
b. Almost always. La. App. 3.22% (1/3 1) D. Ct. 0%




La. App. 41.9% (13/3 1) D. Ct. 60% (69/115)
La. App. 0% D. Ct. 4.3% (5/115)
7. How often do attorneys who argue before the court rely on legal treatises or
law review articles to support their arguments when the arguments are based
on the Louisiana Constitution or Louisiana enacted law (other than the Civil
Code)?
a. Always. La. App. 3.22% (1/3 1) D. Ct. 0%
b. Almost always. La. App. 3.22% (1/3 1) D. Ct. 0%
c. Sometimes. La. App. 54.83% (17/31) D. Ct. 37.6% (44/117)
d. Seldom. La. App. 38.7% (12/31) D. Ct. 57.26%
e. Never. La. App. 0%
(67/117)
D. Ct. 5.12% (6/117)
8. When attorneys who argue before the court rely on a line of prior decisions
interpreting the Louisiana Civil Code, which line of decisions includes at least
one Louisiana Supreme Court decision, do they argue that the court is bound
to or must follow that line of decisions?
a. Always. La. App. 19.35% (6/31) D. C t. 1 3.1 5 %
b. Almost always. La. App. 67.74% (21/31)
c. Sometimes. La. App. 12.90% (4/3 1)
d. Seldom. La. App. 0%






D. Ct. 3.5% (4/114)
D. Ct. 1.75% (2/114)
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9. When attorneys who argue before the court rely on a line of prior decisions
interpreting Louisiana law that is not based on the Louisiana Civil Code, which
line of decisions includes at least one Louisiana Supreme Court decision, do
they argue that the court is bound to or must follow that line of decisions?
a. Always. La. App. 29.03% (9/31) D. Ct. 16.37%
(19/1 16)
b. Almost always. La. App. 58.06% (18/3 1) D. C t. 61.20%
(71/116)
c. Sometimes. La. App. 9.67% (3/31) D. C t. 1 8.9 6 %
(22/116)
d. Seldom. La. App. 3.22% (1/31) D. Ct. 2.5% (3/116)
e. Never. La. App. 0% D. Ct. .86% (1/116)
10. Do you consider it within your power and authority to overrule a decision of
your own court that you believe incorrectly interpreted the Louisiana
Civil Code?
a. Yes. La. App. 67.74% (21/31) D. Ct. 90.9% (101/111)
b. No. La. App. 32.25% (10/31) D. Ct. 9% (10/111)
11. Do you consider it within your power and authority to overrule a decision of your
own court that you believe incorrectly interpreted the Louisiana Constitution or
Louisiana enacted law (other than the Civil Code)?
a. Yes. La. App. 66.66% (20/30) D. Ct. 90.3% (103/114)
b. No. La. App. 33.33% (10/30) D. Ct. 9.64% (11/114)
(Louisiana Supreme Court justices should skip questions 12-15.)
12. When attorneys who argue before the court rely on a line of prior decisions
interpreting the Louisiana Civil Code, which line of decisions includes at least
one decision from the Louisiana Court of Appeal in which they are arguing or to
which an appeal would be brought, do they argue that the court is bound to or
must follow that line of decisions?
a. Always. La. App. 16.12%(5/31) D. Ct. 11.9%(14/117)
b. Almost always. La. App. 48.38% (15/31) D. Ct. 59.82% (70/117)
c. Sometimes. La. App. 25.80% (8/31) D. Ct. 23.93% (28/117)
d. Seldom. La. App. 3.22 (1/3 1) D. Ct. 3.41% (4/117)
e. Never. La. App. 6.45% (2/3 1) D. Ct. .85% (1/117)
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13. When attorneys who argue before the court rely on a line of prior decisions
interpreting Louisiana law that is not based on the Louisiana Civil Code, which
line of decisions includes at least one decision from the Louisiana Court of
Appeal in which they are arguing or to which an appeal would be brought, do
they argue that the court is bound to or must follow that line of decisions?
a. Always. La. App. 16.12% (5/31) D. Ct. 10.92% (13/119)
b. Almost always. La. App. 48.38% (15/31) D. Ct. 56.30% (67/119)
c. Sometimes. La. App. 29.03% (9/31) D. Ct. 29.41% (35/119)
d. Seldom. La. App. 3.22% (1/31) D. Ct. 3.36% (4/119)
e. Never. La. App. 3.22% (1/3 1) D. Ct. 0%
14. Do you consider it within your power and authority to overrule a Louisiana
Supreme Court decision that you believe incorrectly interpreted the Louisiana
Civil Code?
a. Yes. (If yes, please identify any instances in which you have done
so or in which you believe this action would be appropriate.)
La. App. 16.12%(5/31) D. Ct. 18.10%
(21/116)
b. No. La. App. 83.87% (26/31) D. Ct. 8 1.89%
(95/116)
15. Do you consider it within your power and authority to overrule a Louisiana
Supreme Court decision that you believe incorrectly interpreted the Louisiana
Constitution or Louisiana enacted law (other than the Civil Code)?
a. Yes. (If yes, please identify any instances in which you have done
so or in which you believe this action would be appropriate.)
La. App. 16.12%(5/31) D. Ct. 18.10% (21/116)
b. No. La. App. 83.87% (26/31) D. Ct. 81.89% (95/116)
16. If you were choosing not to follow a relevant line of decisions on an issue based
on the Louisiana Civil Code, which line of decisions includes opinions rendered
by your court or a court to which your decision would be appealed, you would
most likely:
a. Explicitly indicate that you are overruling precedent and explain why;
La. App. 10.71%(3/28) D. Ct. 3.47% (4/115)
b. Distinguish the case at issue from the line of decisions, thereby leaving
the precedent in place;
La. App. 32.14% (9/28) D. Ct. 38.26% (44/115)
c. A or B, depending upon the circumstances of the case;
La. App. 57.14% (16/28) D. Ct. 56.52% (65/115)
d. Not mention the line of decisions or give it little mention.
La. App. 0% D. Ct. 1.73% (2/115)
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17. If you were choosing not to follow a relevant line of decisions on an issue
governed by the Louisiana Constitution or Louisiana enacted law (other than the
Louisiana Civil Code), which line of decisions includes opinions rendered by
your court or a court to which your decision would be appealed, you would most
likely:
a. Explicitly indicate that you are overruling precedent and explain why;
La. App. 7.4% (2/27) D. Ct. 3.5% (4/113)
b. Distinguish the case at issue from the line of decisions, thereby
leaving the precedent in place;
La. App. 29.62% (8/27) D. Ct. 39.82% (45/113)
c. A or B, depending upon the circumstances of the case;
La. App. 62.96% (17/27) D. Ct. 55.75% (63/113)
d. Not mention the line of decisions or give it little mention.
La. App. 0% D. Ct. .88% (1/113Yes. (If yes,
please explain below.)
18. If you were choosing not to follow one relevant decision interpreting Louisiana
law (as opposed to a line of decisions) rendered by your court or a court to which
your decision would be appealed, you would most likely:
a. Explicitly indicate that you are overruling the earlier decision and explain
why; La. App. 7.4 (2/27) D. Ct. 10.34% (12/117)
b. Distinguish the case at issue from the relevant decision;
La. App. 40.74% (11/27) D. Ct. 43.96% (51/117)
c. A or B, depending upon the circumstances of the La. App.se;
La. App. 51.85% (14/27) D. Ct. 43.96% (51/117)
d. Not mention the earlier decision or give it little mention.
La. App. 0% D. Ct. 2.58% (3/117)
19. Have you ever overruled a line of decisions prospectively, that is, by ruling
consistently with an existing line of decisions on the case before the court, but
overruling the line of decisions for future cases?
a. Yes La. App. 0% D. Ct. .87% (1/114)
b. No. La. App. 100% (29/29) D. Ct. 99.12% (113/114)
20. Are you likely to be influenced by prior Louisiana decisions in some areas of law
more than other areas of law?
a. Yes. (If yes, please explain below.)
La. App. 16/66% (5/30) D. Ct. 21.73% (25/115)
b. No. La. App. 83.33% (25/30) D. Ct. 78.26% (90/115)
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21. How often are your decisions influenced by legal treatises or law review articles?
a. Always. La. App. 0% D. Ct. .84% (1/118)
b. Almost always. La. App. 12.90% (4/3 1) D. Ct. .84% (1/118)
c. Sometimes. La. App. 54.83 (17/3 1) D. Ct. 56.7% (67/118)
d. Seldom. La. App. 29% (9/31) D. Ct. 38.13% (45/118)
e. Never. La. App. 3.22% (1/31) D. Ct. 3.38% (4/118)
22. Are you likely to be influenced by legal treatises or law review articles in some
areas of law more than other areas of law?
a. Yes. (If yes, please explain below.)
La. App.41.93%(13/31) D. Ct. 31.62% (37/117)
b. No. La. App. 58.06% (18/31) D. Ct. 68.37% (80/117)
23. If an issue is not apparently governed by a Louisiana Civil Code article, a
Louisiana Constitution article, or other Louisiana enacted law, what would you
rely on to guide your decision? (Select all that apply.)
a. Prior decisions of Louisiana state courts;
La. App. 83.87% (26/3 1) D. Ct. 85.47% (100/117)
b. A legal treatise or law review article;
La. App. 70.9% (22/31) D. Ct. 62.39% (73/117)
c. Prior decisions of courts other than Louisiana state courts;
La. App. 67.74% (21/31) D. Ct. 43.58% (51/117)
d. Louisiana Civil Code articles, Louisiana Constitution articles, or other
Louisiana enacted laws that govern analogous or similar issues or
interests;
La. App. 70.9% (22/31) D. Ct. 77.77% (91/117)
e. The concept of equity;
La. App. 51.6% (16/31) D. Ct. 57.26% (67/117)
f. Custom;
La. App. 25.8% (8/31) D. Ct. 35% (41/117)
g. Other (please specify below).
La. App. 3.22% (1/31) D. Ct. 3.41% (4/117)
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said A was most influential (15/30)
said B was most influential (1/30)
said C was most influential (2/30)
said D was most influential (10/30)
said E was most influential (2/30)
said F was most influential
said G was most influential
said A was least influential (1/29)
said B was least influential (5/29)
said C was least influential (8/29)
said D was least influential (1/29)
said E was least influential (5/29)
said F was least influential (5/29)
said G was least influential (4/29)
D. Ct. 74.33% (84/113)
D. Ct. 4.42% (5/113)
D. Ct. 1.76% (2/113)
D. Ct. 15.92% (18/113)
D. Ct. 2.65% (3/113)
D. Ct. 0%
D. Ct. .88% (1/113)
D. Ct. .88% (1/113)
D. Ct. 10.61%(12/113)
D. Ct. 17.69% (20/113)
D. Ct. 4.42% (5/113)
D. Ct. 26.54% (30/113)
D. Ct. 34.51% (39/113)
D. Ct. 6.19% (7/113)
25. Would you be interested in participating in a follow-up interview concerning the
issues addressed in this survey?
a. Yes. (If yes, please provide name and contact information below.)
La. App. 40% (12/30) D. Ct. 27.19% (31/114)
b. No. La. App. 60% (18/30) D. Ct. 72.8% (83/114)
You have reached the end of the survey. Thank you for participating in this project.
Feel free to write any additional comments about the survey or your responses below.
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